OCTOBER 2009

Book Reviews

AMERICAN COMMANDO: Evans Carlson, His WWII Marine Raiders, and America’s First Special Forces Mission.

Raid Into History

Reviewed by Colin M. Colbourn

>Mr. Colbourn was an intern at the History Division, Marine Corps University, and is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Southern Mississippi.

Marine Raiders in World War II (WWII) evoke images of stealthy camouflaged special forces riding low on rubber boats flawlessly landing ashore at islands throughout the Pacific in order to slip behind enemy lines. Yet John Wukovits argues in his book, American Commando, that the 2d Marine Raider Battalion, formed and trained by Evans F. Carlson, was much more. Carlson was one of the most intellectual, innovative, yet divisive officers in the Corps’ proud history. Through the use of numerous oral histories and interviews, Wukovits synthesizes previous studies on Carlson and his Raiders and makes a balanced and insightful presentation.

Wukovits documents Carlson’s life from his formative years in Nicaragua and China through his successes and failures during WWII. The existing literature regarding Carlson and his Raiders is surprisingly limited and often focuses on specific engagements. Through the use of Carlson’s personal papers collection at the Marine Corps Archives, as well as the papers of James Roosevelt (President Franklin Roosevelt’s oldest son and Carlson’s executive officer), Wukovits presents a comprehensive analysis of Carlson to date.

The author presents Carlson as a man filled with curiosity about the world and characterized by both philosophical awareness and religious zeal. By the late 1930s, Carlson had military experience in the Philippines, Nica-

ragua, and China. Carlson was criticized for his interest in the Communists, and his experience in China would haunt him for the rest of his career. Carlson, however, observed Chinese leaders, such as Mao Tse Tung, who taught the Marine that the conduct of guerrilla warfare meant a combination of military skill, physical fitness and, most importantly, mental toughness and intellectual ability.

At its strongest point, American Commando provides the first comprehensive analysis of the Makin Raid and the debacle surrounding the word “surrender,” which plagued Carlson and his Raiders ever since. Wukovits finds that Carlson was out of his element during the Makin operation, which, due to a lack of intelligence, became an entrenched conventional battle. However, with the President’s son on the island and Carlson’s “town meeting” style leadership, the author finds that it is unlikely Carlson outright decided to surrender without any input from his Marines. The events that occurred at Makin are still debated today, and even though surrender never occurred, the very possibility hangs over Carlson’s legacy. While some previous authors present their conclusions as fact, Wukovits skillfully examines and presents evidence, including after-action reports, interviews with Raiders, and Carlson’s own development as a leader, in order to allow the reader to reach a more holistic view of the events at Makin.

Much to his credit, Wukovits allows the reader to view Carlson’s ideology progress until he stumbled at Makin. Wukovits also demonstrates how Carlson exonerated himself with his highly successful “long patrol” on Guadalcanal. While the author presents an extensive examination of Carlson’s Raiders, perhaps more emphasis on the differences between the two Raider battalions and further comparison of both Merritt Edson and Carlson could also enhance the reader’s understanding of the dynamic relationship between the two commanders and their units. Far from a popular book about the Corps’ first special forces, Wukovits’ American Commando is a thoroughly researched and well-written study on leadership, tactical innovation, and the intellectual side of war. The book also provides insight into the political and military challenges that often accompany innovation in war-

time. American Commando is valuable for both officers and academics alike, particularly in the current asymmetrical conflict as old and new ideologies compete to achieve victory.

LEATHERNECKS: An Illustrated History of the United States Marine Corps. By Merrill L. Bartlett and Jack Sweetman. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2008

An Illustrative History

Reviewed by Charles D. Melson

> Mr. Melson is the Chief Historian, History Division, U.S. Marine Corps.

On my personal reference shelf are histories by Heinl, Metcalf, Millett, Moskin, and Simmons. Added to these will be this volume by Bartlett and Sweetman, both of whom taught history at the U.S. Naval Academy. LtCol Bartlett served as a Marine for some 20 years, with two tours in Vietnam. He received the William P. Clements Award as a military instructor and two Robert D. Heinl, Jr. Awards for essays. He currently lives on Vashon Island, WA. Dr. Sweetman was a professor for 20 years at the Naval Academy. A U.S. Army veteran, he was a Ford Fellow at Emory University. The Alfred Thayer Mahan Award, Naval History Author of the Year, and John Lyman Book Award are among his awards and accolades.

Bartlett and Sweetman previously partnered on The U.S. Marine Corps: An Illustrated History (Naval Institute Press, 2001). It had some 14 chapters covering events from 1775 to 2000, with black and white illustrations and maps, notes, selected bibliography, and index. In fact, this current volume is different only in its use of color and an additional chapter to bring it up to date from 2001 to 2007. Why it was retitled is a puzzle. One major difference is that the current volume no longer uses the footnotes present in its predecessor, in favor of chapter further readings lists.

As a pictorial history, it does not claim to be a critical or definitive work. But the background of both authors ensures a narrative that is insightful history. For this new work, endorsements were garnered from the current Director, U.S. Marine Corps History Division, Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer; his predecessor, Col John W. Ripley; and other noted historians of the Marine Corps, including Col Allan R. Millet, Col Joseph H. Alexander, and LtCol Kenneth W. Estes. Sources for research were the Marine Corps Historical Center, Naval Historical Center, Library of Congress, Marine Corps University Gray Research Center, U.S. Naval Academy Museum, and Nimitz Library. The authors prepared well-crafted chapters that provide a complete narrative of the Marine Corps’ story with a full and balanced perspective. They have ensured that both the operational and institutional stories have been presented with equal consideration. The stories are punctuated with the contributions of key individuals or personalities. The use of maps, artwork, and photographs support this effort in a lavish style. In this, their extensive background in U.S. Navy and Marine Corps history comes through with a quality product.

I would, however, take them to task for the final chapter, which is certainly more current events than history. While LtCol Estes worked with the History Division on a narrative of the war in Iraq, official works by Dr. Carter Markesan, Col Nicholas Reynolds, and the History Division’s companion anthology should have been used. Even Headquarters Marine Corps’ Concepts & Programs and its almanac would have contributed more detail on these current topics. In fact, official volumes seem to be lacking in this Marine Corps history in favor of secondary sources. Also missing is the distinctive structure of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), which has been the unique employment of the Corps in the last half century (a contribution as significant as the World War II amphibious effort). This includes the air element, with its companion ground, logistics, and com-

mand components. In terms of the illustrative material, pictures that reflect this 21st century view of the Marine Corps and its MAGTF components are missing in favor of those of riflemen in combat. While “every Marine is a rifleman,” few are actually in the killer elite, and supporting arms still serve an important function. But none would get far without combat service support.