OCTOBER 2009
Retooling for AfghanistanIt’s not a new fight; we’ve been there, but it requires retooling our forces |
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By Cols Norman Cooling, Dale Alford, & Chip Bierman & LtCol James Donnellan> Col Cooling commanded 3d Bn, 3d Mar from June 2004 to October 2006 and deployed in support of both OEF and OIF. He is currently the CO, Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, CA. >>Col Alford commanded 3d Bn, 6th Mar from March 2004 to May 2006 and deployed in support of both OEF and OIF. He is currently the Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program, Institute for Defense Analysis. >>>Col Bierman commanded 1st Bn, 3d Mar from July 2005 to November 2007 and deployed in support of both OEF and OIF. He is currently the CO, 3d Mar (Remain Behind Element) and will assume command of 3d Mar in November. >>>>LtCol Donnellan commanded 2d Bn, 3d Mar from July 2005 to June 2007, including deployments in support of both OEF and OIF. He is currently the Deputy Chief, Strategy Division, Policy and Strategy Directorate (J5), U.S. Central Command.
As the Marine Corps draws down its forces deployed in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and prepares to increase its presence to a Marine expeditionary brigade in Afghanistan, it is important to recognize the differences between these two operational environments and plan, man, train, and equip accordingly. It is somewhat surprising that recent articles treat Afghanistan as if it were a new fight for the Marine Corps. This, of course, is not true, as Marines have been involved in the fight there since its nexus in 2001. The lessons gained from the Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs), separate battalions, and embedded training teams that have deployed to Afghanistan in the past should not be lost as we prepare to boost the level of our commitment there. We believe that our collective experiences as battalion commanders in both Afghanistan’s Regional Command (RC)-East and Iraq’s Multinational Force-West provide us with unique insights that may assist commanders at all levels who are deploying to Afghanistan for the first time. Between the four of us, we have a combined 27 months as battalion commanders in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). Each of us followed these sequential OEF deployments with subsequent combat tours in Al Anbar Province as battalion commanders serving in OIF. In transitioning from one environment to the other, we each had to plan, man, train, and equip our respective battalions in ways to account for the differences between the operational areas and the times in which we were deploying to them. We should note that our OEF deployments were to RC-East and not to RC-South, where Marine forces are currently deployed. Nonetheless, we believe that the lessons learned that we illustrate below remain applicable to much of RC-South, and reviews of this article by recent RC-South battalion commanders validate this position. Commanders should recognize and understand the critical differences in the physical and human terrains between operating in Iraq and operating in Afghanistan and adjust their predeployment preparations accordingly. Physical Terrain DifferencesAlthough there have been different dynamics at play in the various subareas of Al Anbar, it can largely be viewed as a homogenous environment. With regard to the physical terrain, it is primarily an open desert river plain dotted with widely separated urban areas that become increasingly close as one nears Baghdad. While the urban areas offer challenges associated with complex and compartmentalized terrain, the open plains areas that separate them are the optimum environment for the way the Marine Corps equips and trains. One would be hard pressed to find an environment more similar to Twentynine Palms than Al Anbar. Our tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) are largely optimized for operations in this relatively simplistic environment across the six warfighting functions. Al Anbar’s open plains offer no terrain or vegetation impediments to our intelligence collection systems, and with the exception of an occasional sandstorm, they rarely limit visibility. The same is true for our command, control, and communications (C3) systems. The majority of these systems are terrestrial, line of sight, and very high frequency (VHF), and with the notable exception of the inner urban areas, Al Anbar largely allows for their effective employment. Moreover, command and control in Al Anbar has been largely a U.S.-centric problem with no coalition partners outside of indigenous forces and few nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved. Traditional military command relationships (e.g., tactical control and operational control) prevail. Al Anbar’s robust network of roads and highways, coupled with its flat terrain and low elevation, allows Marines to employ and rely almost solely on those mobility assets with which we are most familiar and comfortable—motorized vehicles and rotary-wing aircraft. Not only does this benefit movement and maneuver, it also makes sustaining forces a relatively easy proposition. Iraq’s seaports also simplify sustainment at the strategic and operational levels. Al Anbar’s simplistic terrain also affords advantages in the employment of fires. Outside the urban areas, Marines can frequently employ their weapons at their maximum effective ranges. The lack of vegetation also dampens the risk of generating fires, much like Twentynine Palms. Al Anbar’s physical terrain also affords force protection advantages. With forward operating bases (FOBs) and combat outposts (COPs) located throughout the urban areas, dismounted patrolling in Al Anbar can be kept to a reasonable duration, while mounted patrolling affords Marines the opportunity to maximize their load. In both cases it is uncomfortable, but certainly possible, to wear full body armor, a significant force protection advantage. Few if any of these advantages exist in the diverse, complex, and compartmentalized terrain that characterizes Afghanistan’s large unit areas of operation (AOs).1 This is not to discount the similarities between large expanses of RC-South and Al Anbar. Indeed, much of RC-South is also open, hot, and dry desert, and the Helmand/ Arghandab River Valley is much like the Euphrates River Valley, with the exception of Helmand’s much denser vegetation. The difference is in the variety of terrain in RC-South and in Afghanistan as a whole, a problem that is multiplied by the fact that unit AOs in Afghanistan are significantly larger than those assigned to like-sized units in Iraq, where the geographic force density has always been greater. Operations in Afghanistan, therefore, often require battalion-sized units to operate in the desert and in the mountains, in rural and in urban areas, in temperature variances, and at altitudes high and low. Across the warfighting functions Marines must adjust their TTP to meet the increased demands associated with this more demanding, heterogeneous environment. Intelligence systems in Afghanistan’s mountainous regions are severely impacted by terrain, vegetation, weather, and altitude. From obscured satellite images to crosswinds throwing unmanned aircraft systems into mountainsides, we all suffered more significantly from intelligence limitations in Afghanistan than in Iraq. Further, the broadly distributed nature of operations in Afghanistan’s wide expanses of compartmentalized terrain necessitates collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence at levels as low as the platoon and, sometimes, the squad. Afghanistan’s complex terrain and large unit AOs also greatly complicate C3. The terrain places a premium on truly understanding high-frequency (HF) wave propagation and positioning forces accordingly. Where VHF must be used, it typically comes with a retransmission requirement, thereby increasing the tax for security forces. Limited satellite communications channels make the lost art of communications brevity codes a must. Afghanistan’s larger unit AOs, coupled with the involvement of more international organizations and NGOs, make it a more complicated command and control challenge for unit leaders at all levels. One of the authors, for example, served under the operational control of an Army brigade while responsible for an AO in which two Afghan Kandak battalions and Afghan border police with their associated embedded training teams, six provincial governors and police forces, two special operations force operational detachment As, five provincial reconstruction teams with five different U.S. Government agencies represented, and at least eight NGOs operated concurrently. Coalition operations in RC-South add further C3 complications as units must wrestle not only with appropriate command relationships but also with different political objectives, rules of engagement, information security measures, and command and control hardware and software. Traditional military command relationships are insufficient and the number of unconventional “HandCon-type” relationships exceeds the capacity of a single battalion commander and demands that subordinate leaders in distributed positions have more leeway in communicating strategic messages; working with Afghan, coalition, and interagency leaders at higher levels; and designing civil-military operations and the like. This, in turn, requires that leaders at all levels provide clear-cut left and right lateral limits to their subordinates in each of these areas. Commanders should also not underestimate the physical demands of the diverse terrain, altitude, and weather on the individual Marine’s ability to move in Afghanistan. Limited road networks and weather severely restrict motorized and heliborne operations and demand creative mobility techniques, such as the use of pack animals to lighten the Marine’s load and extend his patrolling radius and area of influence. Currently, movement in RC-South is primarily off-road, with the exception of a small number of paved roadways. The same restrictions on our conventional mobility assets greatly complicate logistics sustainment. To work around these restrictions, units must master techniques like employing the global positioning guided containerized delivery system (CDS) from fixed-wing aircraft that can fly above the weather. The larger respective unit AOs and the lack of support infrastructure likewise complicate sustainment. Afghanistan is inherently a more austere, truly expeditionary environment. Weapons take on different relative values in the complex physical terrain of Afghanistan as opposed to Al Anbar. Mountainous terrain, for example, places a premium on indirect fire systems, such as mortars and grenade launchers, relative to the direct fire systems that are able to exploit their maximum effective ranges in more desert-like or open plains environments. Commanders adept at employing fires should also recognize that compartmentalized terrain could afford advantages in protecting adjacent forces from fratricide as long as situational awareness is maintained. The large AOs and disaggregated nature of operations require fire control authorities to be pushed down the chain of command, and this, in turn, requires modifications to the supporting C3 network. Finally, Afghanistan’s large AOs and diverse terrain have implications on force protection. If you are going to take the fight to the enemy in Afghanistan, you are going to have to move in complex physical terrain. That means you are going to have to accept an increased level of risk relative to operations in Iraq. It is simply not possible to conduct the necessary extended foot-mobile patrols across dramatic elevation changes and at altitude in full body armor. Conversely, the increased mobility attained by reducing body armor affords an additional measure of force protection in its own right. Human Terrain Differences
The differences in physical terrain between Al Anbar, Iraq and sizeable portions of Afghanistan are more than rivaled by the differences in human terrain. As with its physical terrain, Al Anbar’s population is largely homogenous. That is, the people of Al Anbar share a common religion (Sunni Muslim), a common language (Arabic), and a common culture. Although tribal rivalries exist, they may be viewed as benign relative to those in Afghanistan. In stark contrast, the human terrain of Afghanistan is heterogeneous. In a single battalion AO, one can find multiple languages (e.g., Dari and Pashtu) and dialects (e.g., Nurastani, Korengali, etc.). Although the religion is Islam, individual mullahs have a far more dramatic influence on its interpretation by their “flocks.” Tribal codes, such as Pashtuwali, have greater bearing on daily life than any code of law, and even Pashtuwali is open to extremes in interpretation from subtribe to subtribe, many of which have been fighting amongst themselves for decades if not centuries. Tribal conflicts are intensified by the geographic separation afforded by compartmentalized terrain, historic rivalries, a centuries-long collective memory of affronts, and an intense competition for scarce resources. Further, “warlordism” and “druglordism” have fragmented the nature of the tribal system in RC-South. These powerbrokers often rule the population more effectively than tribal chiefs and elders. In such a diverse environment, teaching Marines “how” vice “what” to think culturally becomes a critical requirement. These intense microdivisions in Afghan culture also make a broad scale dynamic like the “Awakening” in Iraq, less likely to occur. An additional contrast should be recognized between the human terrain of Al Anbar versus that of Afghanistan. Specifically, the adversaries are different. In Al Anbar a disenfranchised Sunni population in a security vacuum provided support to Islamic extremist groups like al-Qaeda as an alternative to an American-sponsored, Shi’a-dominated government. The vast majority of Iraqis are not Islamic extremists, and the marriage was one of convenience until the insurgent leaders demonstrated to the traditional tribal leaders that they were more of a threat to Al Anbar’s citizens than the Americans.2 Because the majority of Iraqis did not want an active role in the insurgency, insurgents were limited in the tactics they could employ. The most successful of these tactics were the employment of improvised explosive devices, suicide bombs, and hit-and-run small arms and mortar attacks on fixed U.S. positions. The adversaries in Afghanistan are far more closely aligned to al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups. The Afghan population as a whole, in fact, would be considered “ultraconservative” by the majority of the Islamic world. Both the Taliban and the Hezbe-Islami Gulbuddin have longstanding ties with Islamic radicalism. Local populations are more easily swayed and can play a more prominent role. Neighboring Pakistan provides a more robust and overt preparation and recruiting area than anything afforded in Iraq by its neighbors. As a result, insurgent attacks can be more robust. In addition to the tactics used in Al Anbar, insurgents in Afghanistan often assemble company- and greater-sized forces to conduct complex attacks, and they are less inclined to break contact. This presents a special challenge to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Specifically, they must be able to transition quickly and effectively between a disaggregated security “laydown” oriented toward stability operations and a conventional force organization optimized to defeat company- and greater-sized enemy forces. We must also acknowledge and understand that while the insurgency in Iraq has been urban based, the one in Afghanistan is rural based and more closely follows Mao Zedong’s three-phased revolutionary model. The Taliban continues to conduct phase two guerrilla operations while seeking opportunities to escalate to phase three war of movement operations as they attempted in RC-South in 2006. Rural-based counterinsurgency (COIN) operations demand that conventional units get out of the FOB mentality and live among the population with Afghan security forces in platoon- and squad-sized outposts. Finally, we should recognize that, similar to Iraq but to a significantly greater degree, government misrule and abusive behavior by government forces help fuel Afghanistan’s insurgency. Manning, Equipping, and TrainingThe differences we have outlined above point to several changes that the Marine Corps and its commanders should consider making to their approaches for manning, equipping, and training units for operations in Afghanistan. A single article does not allow us to mention all of them, but the following provide a select list. Manning. The disaggregated or distributed nature of COIN in Afghanistan necessitates pushing personnel with combat support and combat service support specialties down to even lower echelons than we have been doing in Iraq. The company-level operations center (CLOC) with integrated company-level intelligence cell concept remains valid, but we each had platoons pushed out to distances and in terrain where they needed their own such cells. Moreover, these platoons were in a position where they had to control their own fires from their COPs, thereby necessitating personnel with those specialties. In short, the size and diverse, disaggregated nature of operations in Afghanistan not only fully validate the enhanced company operations model, but they also suggest the need for occasional “enhanced platoon operations.” Effective operations in RC-South will require more robust engineer assets to overcome the limitations of its rudimentary infrastructure. Likewise, MAGTFs operating in Afghanistan should have more robust aviation combat elements (ACEs) and logistics combat elements (LCEs) relative to the ground combat element than was the case in Iraq. Helicopters, in particular, are indispensable mobility assets in the large and complex AOs of Afghanistan. Air assault missions mitigate the effectiveness of improvised explosive devices and help cover the distances necessary to combat a rural-based insurgency. The ACE and LCE must adjust to disaggregating or distributing to a degree with which they have not traditionally been comfortable. For example, the ACE should be capable of forming semipermanent detachments in support of dislocated companies to provide assault support, rotary-wing close air support, and casualty evacuation capabilities. Finally, we need time to train personnel to a more complicated array of TTP. The abbreviated 7-month training cycle with manpower fills occurring just before (or sometimes during) the Block IV mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) and with no time for Block V remediation is self-defeating. To this end, meeting the Commandant’s goal of a one-to-two deploy-to-dwell cycle is exceptionally important. Equipping. As mentioned, weapons take on different relative values in complex terrain, and this should influence how units are equipped for operations in such areas. Units assigned to Afghanistan should seek additional indirect fire assets and counterbattery radar systems for their FOBs and COPs. It is generally advisable to take a 60mm mortar on dismounted patrols. Because of their inability to range the adjacent terrain around FOBs, 81mm mortars are frequently of marginal value on anything other than mounted patrols. In such cases attaining 120mm mortars and 105mm howitzers from our Army counterparts is wise. Heavy mortars with their high angles of fire are generally easier to adjust on target in vertical terrain than howitzers, which are characterized by a flatter trajectory. Despite their limitations in bad weather and at altitude, MAGTFs deploying to Afghanistan should have a robust complement of rotary-wing attack and assault support aircraft. Communications assets should weigh heavily on HF and satellite communications systems to the extent available. Individual equipment should include the reconnaissance patrol pack and small arms protective inserts (SAPI) plate carriers. Units deploying to cold areas should have the seven-layer clothing system. Finally, we should not lose sight of the fact that the majority of our equipment, most notably our aviation platforms, is optimized for sea-level littoral power projection. To employ it effectively in Afghanistan requires that we recognize the effects of terrain, altitude, and weather and identify and adjust our TTP accordingly. Training. More than any other area, our approach to training must change to be successful in Afghanistan. At the base level, we must increase the physical fitness of Marines by getting away from shorts and sneakers and returning to functional fitness, including running, hiking, climbing, and grappling in our assault and combat loads. Where possible, we need to do this off of the roads and trails, in rugged mountainous terrain, and at altitude. We will have to train leaders to think through proper force protection posture levels for each mission, identify and accept risks, and leverage alternatives, such as the SAPI plate holder. Nonetheless, we are still going to be heavy relative to our adversary. We have to have Marines who can operate under the load and in difficult environmental conditions. The nature of rural-based COIN operations requires a return to our expeditionary roots and an outright rejection of large FOBs. Our tactical level training must also take into account the difficulties of sustaining forces at the operational and strategic levels in a landlocked country with little to no infrastructure and a food deficit. Taken together, this means training in a disaggregated fashion and truly “living hard” by doing without FOB luxuries, such as the Internet, formal gyms, and elaborate dining facilities.
The differences between Al Anbar’s and Afghanistan’s physical and human terrain suggests the need to train individual Marines and small units in a multitude of special TTP, such as HF and satellite communications, high-angle fire, vertical interval indirect fire adjustments, animal packing, CDS drops, and cultural recognition to name but a few. Marines in all MAGTF elements must be able to fluidly adjust the TTP associated with the employment of their weapons and communications systems between desert plain, mountain, and urban environments. This means getting off the desert floor and into the barren, rugged mountains of Twentynine Palms and other distributed venues. It also means leveraging venues, such as Bridgeport and Hawthorne Army Depot, for skills, environmental, and altitude training. This is particularly important for our ACE if, with typically fewer and less optimized aircraft, it is to provide the same level of ground force support as Army aviation has in RC-East. Just as critical are the training differences at the 7000–8000 task series in our training and readiness manuals. We must do better than a single, confined venue MRX in preparing for operations in support of OEF. If a Marine experiences the same task in a multitude of environments, he moves beyond the “script” and develops the intuitive decisionmaking skills necessary to succeed in heterogeneous environments. As many exercises as possible, to include the MRX, should force battalions to disaggregate their companies and platoons over extended distances that replicate those in Afghanistan. Figures 1 and 2 put this into perspective. This, in turn, should force the ACE to provide forward detachments where necessary to ensure appropriate casualty evacuation and timely, responsive assault and close air support. Exercising rotary-wing support over extended distances and at higher elevations is particularly important. Moreover, the MRX should require the LCE to find the correct balance between general and direct support organizations in support of the deployment as a whole as well as for select operations. Exercises should force the MAGTF to rapidly move from a widely disaggregated security posture with units conducting COIN into an attack on reinforced company-sized aggressor forces. They should likewise require them to rapidly disaggregate again to avoid losing momentum in the COIN. Because of the heterogeneous human terrain that characterizes Afghanistan, we must also reexamine our approach to cultural training. Our training programs should force Marines to assess the cultural dynamics taking place in their AO before taking actions. Consistent with the International Security Assistance Force’s Tactical Directive of 30 December 2008, our training programs should emphasize the extent of Pashtun resentment for foreign forces in remote villages and the imperative for promoting, leveraging, and leading with indigenous forces. Understanding Pashtunwali and its differences as interpreted from mullah to mullah and subtribe to subtribe is particularly important, as many of the TTP we use in Iraq (cordon and search, population control, aviation strikes, and interaction with women) require significant adjustment to avoid far more severe cultural backlashes. Each small unit must be prepared to interact with people in multiple languages and dialects (e.g., the local population in Pashtu, many Afghan National Army soldiers and government officials in Dari, and others in Farsi or other dialects). We have been only marginally successful in teaching a small number of Marines conversational Arabic. It is doubtful we could succeed in training a single squad in multiple languages. Thus, skilled employment of interpreters, electronic translators, and talk and point cards should have a prominent place in our training programs. Marine leaders at the platoon and company levels should be exposed to mediation techniques, and their cultural training should also account for their regular engagement with coalition partners, other government agencies, and NGOs. Conclusion
Notes 2. Arguably, the “Awakening” would have happened sooner in Al Anbar had the Marines not been required to consolidate for the clearing of Fallujah and, thereby, abandon those who had initially cooperated with American forces in the rest of the province. |
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To be successful in Afghanistan, Marines must recognize and understand the critical differences in both physical and human terrain between operating in Iraq and operating in Afghanistan, and we must adjust the way we man, train, and equip accordingly. While we have highlighted the differences in OEF operations as opposed to those in OIF, we would be remiss if we were not to point out that there are many similarities. In this sense we do not want to “throw the baby out with the bath water” by moving away from OIF lessons learned that remain valid. TTP, such as the CLOC, “Cop on the Beat,” and COMBAT HUNTER, for example, all remain valid. The employment of effective combined arms, albeit significantly different in Afghanistan, likewise remains a valid and critical capability. In fact, we would argue that such TTP take on even greater importance. Nonetheless, the differences in physical and human terrain must be recognized. Deploying commanders must make the appropriate adjustments to their predeployment preparations now.
