NOVEMBER 2009
The Road To The Graveyard: A Bloody Footnote to the Battle for Hue |
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by Chuck Gilbert and Ned ClarkVisit the authors' site at: http://www.2-7-68.com >Mr. Gilbert currently resides in Florida and was an 18-year-old lance corporal with B/9Eng during the actions described in this article. B/9Eng was assigned to the 101st Airborne Division after it left the Rock Crusher and went to the A Shau Valley for Operation DELAWARE, where more of its Marines were wounded and equipment destroyed by NVA ground action. >>Mr. Clark served as a corporal in B/9Eng during the actions described in this article. He currently resides in Ohio. This little known passage of history is dedicated to Sgt Hedlund, Sgt Robbins, and Doc Collier, and to all of the fallen heroes who gave their lives on “The Road to the Graveyard.” 29 January 1968 With an alarming increase in the volume of intelligence information concerning the buildup of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) formations in the area of the A Shau Valley, South Vietnam, and from NVA sanctuaries in Laos, the U.S. Marine Corps command in Phu Bai, designated Task Force X-Ray, was originally constituted to oversee Operation CUMBERLAND TRAIL, but its mission was changed to screening the Western approaches to Hue. BGen Foster C. LaHue, the Task Force X-Ray commander, ordered the units slated to participate in Operation CUMBERLAND TRAIL to remain in the area as a blocking force on Provincial Route 547, the west-east corridor from Laos to Hue/Phu Bai. This position was located at grid coordinates YD730130 at the base of Hill 433 near Nam Hoa at a site named the “Rock Crusher.” Company C (Co C), 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (1/1), under the command of Capt M.J. Lindsey; Battery B, 1/11, under the command of 1stLt J.M. Hayes; and Co B, 9th Engineer Battalion (B/9 Eng), under the command of Capt T.K. Mckeown, were collocated at this position along Route 547. Two M–50 Ontos tracked vehicles from 1st Platoon, Co A, Antitanks,1st Tank Battalion, numbers A–11 and A–13, each of which was equipped with six 106mm recoilless rifles, routinely provided convoy security duties escorting resupply convoys from the Rock Crusher to Phu Bai and back. The Ontos also provided antiarmor support in the event that the NVA were to use Route 547 as an invasion route into Hue, spearheaded by NVA tanks. Route 547 crossed the Song Huong (Perfume River) via a pontoon bridge that was also guarded by the Marines. In addition to the Marines, the bridge security element was augmented by U.S. Army M–42 “Dusters” (antiaircraft tracked vehicles equipped with twin automatic Bofors 40mm cannons), which also provided convoy escort duties and static defense at the bridge. These Dusters belonged to Battery D, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery, U.S. Army. Frequent observations of enemy movement in the area around the Rock Crusher identified large numbers of enemy forces, both NVA and Viet Cong, which were traveling in an easterly direction and were largely unimpeded in their movement. Enemy units identified were the 802 NVA Battalion, the Hue City Battalion, the 4th NVA Regiment, the 6th NVA Regiment, and the K4B Battalion. The area in the vicinity of the Rock Crusher was infested with encircling and infiltrating enemy forces. The road network was the lifeline of the Marines at the Rock Crusher. The route from the Rock Crusher to Field Support Logistics Group Alpha, located in Phu Bai, was approximately 15 miles in length. Artillery ammunition, small arms ammunition, and food supplies that were crucial to the survival of this isolated site had to be brought overland through some of the most treacherous and hazardous terrain in the I Corps tactical area of responsibility. Once a vehicle left the paved surface of Route 1 and turned onto the dirt road network that led to the Rock Crusher, the vehicles were exposed to hundreds of possible ambush sites. There was a necessary tradeoff of risk, economy versus safety. To date only random sniper activity or the occasional road mine was encountered by the resupply convoys. Most convoys traveled the road network without incident. A typical convoy would form for the 15-mile trip at the Rock Crusher, cross the pontoon bridge, turn to the north on Route 549 and, after 3 miles or so, turn to the east and travel through Route 547 until intersecting Route 1. From that point the convoy would turn right or south onto Route 1 and travel to Phu Bai. After making the turn to the east from Route 549, to proceed to Route 1, a bridge “bypass” would have to be negotiated to return to the roadway of Route 547. The road was narrow, and it was often flanked on both sides by rice paddies and burial sites. The turns were tight, the countryside was dotted with houses, and it was well treed. The main supply route’s security was provided by Co E, 2/5, commanded by Capt P.A. Duffy.
The Marine engineers of Co B were busy improving their encampment and working on Route 547 to the pontoon bridge. Co C, 1/1 seemed to have the best location, as they were billeted with the U.S. Navy SeaBees, who ran the Rock Crusher. They had concrete bunkers and improved fighting positions and had the benefit of sleeping in barracks constructed of plywood with tin roofs. Different infantry units had rotated in and out of the Rock Crusher providing security for the SeaBees since they had established the Rock Crusher, which did exactly that, crush rocks into gravel. Co B, 1/11 was moved to the Rock Crusher for the original task of supporting Operation CUMBERLAND TRAIL. With the current enemy situation, unknown to all present at that time, the battery would be called upon to rain down death and destruction on enemy forces in and around Hue. The supply route was driven routinely, sometimes by a single vehicle with one occupant. Administrative and logistics task necessitated these trips. Cpl Don Grant (B/9Eng) was one of those drivers who found himself alone on that road, running company errands to Hue and Phu Bai and back to the Rock Crusher.
Routine patrolling of the area in and around Hill 433 was often performed by the individual Marine companies, and sometimes all of the units stationed at the Rock Crusher combined forces for longer and more dangerous patrolling. On one of these patrols, Cpl Johnson (B/9Eng) was gored by a water buffalo while walking point, and a machinegunner reacting quickly dropped the large beast with a burst from his M60 machinegun before the animal could inflict fatal injuries to Johnson. And in the grander scheme of events as they played out in South Vietnam, B/9 Eng had to reimburse the owner of this animal for his loss. Water buffalo seemed to detest the scent given off by Americans.
The Marines were trucked to the pontoon bridge and allowed to swim and bathe in the Perfume River. The area was so peaceful that little thought was given to the NVA advancing on the city of Hue. On an administrative run from Hue to the Rock Crusher, Cpl L.N. Clark (B/9Eng) was driving a personnel carrier with two shotgun riders when they encountered a roadblock consisting of an abandoned vehicle blocking the roadway. There was not a person in sight. With high ground on the right and a ditch on the left, and thinking that they were about to be ambushed, the Marines stopped and hurriedly pushed the disabled vehicle into the ditch and proceeded on to the Rock Crusher. This incident was reported on Clark’s return, but there seemed to be little interest in his finding. The area in which the Rock Crusher was located was noted as the location of several “royal tombs.” Across Route 547 to the south from the Rock Crusher lay a high walled area comprising a few hundred acres of land. The walls were solid granite and 10 feet in height. Several ornate buildings, moats, bodies of water, and a royal tomb were protected by this perimeter wall. Entering this compound was off limits to the Marines. 31 January 1968 In the early morning hours of 31 January 1968, the NVA launched its coordinated attack against the Thua Thien Provincial Capital of Hue. The NVA and Viet Cong forces quickly took control of most of the city of Hue. Thousands of NVA scurried about in the darkness methodically carrying out their individual and unit assignments. They overran Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) positions and controlled most of the Old City of Hue. The Old City was separated from what the French had coined as the “New City” to its south by the Perfume River. The Communist commissars went about their sinister task of rounding up previously identified citizens of Hue and executing them. The ARVN high command asked for Marine intervention in the recapture of the city of Hue. The 1st Marine Regiment would be tasked with this mission with units of the 5th Marine Regiment attached to it and the 11th Marines providing artillery support. 1 February 1968
The Tet Offensive, in and around the city of Hue, had entered into its second day. Tenacious, hard-fighting NVA soldiers were under attack from equally tenacious and determined Marine Corps forces who had but one goal, to retake the city and eliminate the Communist invasion forces holding out there.
The prevailing beauty of the South Vietnamese countryside disguised the fact that a war was being waged nearby. At the Rock Crusher, Battery B was engaged in firing fire missions in support of the Marines embattled in Hue. Without this valuable fire support, the death toll in the Marine ranks would be excessively high and make advancing and clearing operations in the city nearly impossible.
A 13-vehicle convoy, consisting of 1 Ontos, 2 radio jeeps, 6 M34 2 ½-ton trucks, and 3 lowboy tractor-trailers (which were loaded with the ammunition) formed and staged at the ammunition dump in Phu Bai. This force was under the command of WO Peterson of Headquarters Battery, 1/11. Marine infantrymen from 2/5 and “cannon cockers” from 1/11 comprised the security force. Generally each truck carried five to six Marines, the driver, a “shotgun” rider in the cab of the vehicle with him, and four Marines on the back, poised and ready to engage the enemy if the situation so dictated. The Ontos were positioned at the front and rear of the convoy followed by a radio jeep to ensure communications continuity with each other and higher headquarters. At 1400 the convoy departed Phu Bai and made its way north along Route 1 where it was stopped by a roadblock manned by Marines from Co D, 1/1. WO Peterson advanced toward a Marine who appeared from a building on the side of the road. After a few minutes of discussion, the Marine pulled aside the concertina barrier wire and allowed the convoy to continue. Nearing Hue, the convoy encountered several makeshift roadblocks, constructed of furniture and any and all available debris. These positions were seemingly devoid of enemy forces and were subsequently bypassed by the convoy without the convoy’s forward momentum being impeded. A grizzly reminder of an earlier battle on the road that day was the burned out hulk of an ARVN armored vehicle and the bodies of its crew, one of them hanging from the still smoldering vehicle.
The convoy passed over a few bridges guarded by elements of Co D, 1/1 and neared the outskirts of Hue City. There the scenery had been transformed overnight from that of a lush, well-kept area of houses to a nightmarish scene of vast destruction with no living creatures in view. The convoy was stopped on Route 1 at the juncture of the dirt road and turned west and on to the Rock Crusher. Marine engineers started walking in front of the convoy sweeping the dirt road for mines with their electronic mine detecting units. A short distance later, WO Peterson determined that continuing on to the Rock Crusher was too risky and gave orders to turn the convoy around and head back to Phu Bai. As the trucks were backing into an alley to reverse their direction of travel, WO Peterson was called to his jeep for consultation with headquarters. After talking to headquarters, Peterson returned and told the truck drivers that they were going to follow their original plan and continue on to Battery B and the Rock Crusher. WO Peterson ordered the security detail to dismount the trucks and provide security at the intersection until all of the vehicles were back on track and made the turn to the west. As the security team set up a perimeter at the intersection, they noticed a short Caucasian woman and a long-haired man adorned with cameras walking past them. These two apparently had hopped onto a vehicle at the end of the convoy and hitched a ride to Hue with them. It was later surmised from an article published in Life Magazine that the woman was Catherine Leroy (a reporter), based on her description of her journey to Hue on 1 February 1968.
The convoy started rolling again, and with the last four vehicles still on Route 1, the lead vehicle in that group broke down. The driver could not get the truck started. After numerous attempts to get the vehicle running again, this segment of the convoy noticed that all of the vehicles to their front were now out of sight. A short time later WO Peterson’s jeep rolled up on the stalled portion of the convoy. Peterson managed to get the vehicle started, and those last four vehicles moved forward at a very slow pace. The security element was now walking behind the vehicles instead of riding on them. The pace of travel was agonizingly slow. The Marine infantrymen were checking out the houses on the sides of the road for enemy presence. The din of battle to the north of their position, in the vicinity of Hue, was so loud that verbal communications between the security forces was breaking down. As before, the previously broken down truck quit running. This time when WO Peterson arrived on the scene, he decided that he couldn’t waste any more time trying to repair this lowboy tractor-trailer, so he decided to pull the disabled truck from the front with a 2 ½-ton truck and push it from the rear with another. When the vehicles were chained together, the rear of the convoy started to roll once again. The pace was so slow that the infantrymen of the security detail now outpaced the rolling vehicles. The sporadic report of weapons fire grew louder. The Marines had now walked about a half mile from the intersection of Route 1. As the rear of the convoy departed the residential area and proceeded to try to link up with the front of the convoy, to the south lay a hill mass (Hill 103) and to the front and both sides lay a vast open expanse of graveyards. The typical Vietnamese grave consisted of a burial mound surrounded by a concrete wall. These structures made excellent fighting positions and afforded good cover and concealment on what was a natural battlefield. At the top of Hill103 lay a concrete structure, possibly a shrine, surrounded by a concrete wall. This site was an excellent observation post that commanded a 360-degree view of the surrounding area for miles. Unfortunately it was occupied by the NVA. A running gun battle ensued between the Marines and the NVA when the tail end of the convoy entered the graveyard. The NVA were seen running in the graveyard and in a tree line to the south. The distinct cracking sound of bullets as they passed by the Marines’ heads was omnipresent. The convoy came to an “S” curve in the road at approximately YD767191 on the 1:50,000 map of Hue. One of the truck drivers pulled over and shouted at a few of the Marines on the security detail that there were “people” walking parallel to their vehicles. A high embankment masked those people from the view of the Marines at ground level. PFC Reyes (1/11) jumped up on the vehicle and began waving at some of the nearby Marines to join him. The Marines saw the people and were close enough to view the worried expressions on their faces. They were dressed in the uniform of the NVA, and the Marines took them under fire. One of the NVA, who was carrying a mortar tube, fell during this exchange of gunfire. The others took cover behind the walls of some of the graves and returned fire. More Marines converged on this location to join in the fray. LCpl Ronald Taylor (1/11 fire direction center (FDC)) joined two other Marines who were crawling into some bushes near the curve. Taylor thought that the Marines were trying to flank one of the houses from which they were receiving fire. He fired into the house and was surprised when an NVA soldier jumped up in front of him and began to run to the south. Taylor fired again, dropping the NVA. At that moment an NVA mortar started lobbing 82mm mortar rounds at the Marines near the house. After the seventh mortar round impacted near Taylor, peppering him with metal fragments and causing a temporary loss of hearing, he realized that he had to move forward or fall victim to the mortar barrage. PFC Reyes dove in alongside Taylor and looked him over. He noticed the bolt of Taylor’s weapon was to the rear, so he gave Taylor a 20-round rifle magazine to insert into his M16. A few moments later someone yelled, “Cease fire,” and miraculously both sides stopped shooting. The Marines stood in disbelief. A lone rifleman could be heard firing his weapon off in the distance. Cpl Heckman (1/11 headquarters) was observed firing from the offhand (standing) position and advancing toward an unseen enemy. Heckman, who worked at the battalion armory, would have his work cut out for him when they returned to Phu Bai. Most of the M16s were jamming on semiautomatic fire even though the weapons were clean. The biggest complaint was a failure to eject the spent cartridge cases. Someone shouted a command to fall back on the vehicles at the road, and the Marines started to form up. They took up positions in the graveyard as their portion of the convoy was still stalled. The firing resumed, and the Marines fired at the NVA moving around their position. A jeep with about 10 Marines huddled up around it was the scene of a frantic search for a map to call in artillery support, but the map could not be found. One of the Ontos came clanking up the road from the front of the separated convoy. It turned to face the enemy, but the crew could not observe any NVA positions. A grunt (infantryman) jumped onto the Ontos and pointed out enemy positions to the Ontos commander. The Ontos fired one of its 106mm recoilless rifles, but the fire was ineffective, as the Ontos was on a rise and could not depress the tubes of its weapons any lower to engage the enemy targets. At that point NVA mortars resumed firing at the Marines. A mortar round landed next to the Ontos, and the crew piled out to inspect the track for damage. A U.S. Air Force OV–1 “Bird Dog” observation plane arrived overhead. One of the Marines in the jeep was successful in raising the forward air controller in the Bird Dog on the radio, and he described the map situation to the pilot. The pilot related to the Marine that he would fire one of his white phosphorus rockets in the center of the grid and call down the coordinates to the Marines on the ground. Once this was accomplished the Marines on the ground could call in fire missions, as they would know their position without the benefit of the map and could adjust their fire missions. A few moments later an M34 truck, loaded with Marines, from the front of the convoy arrived. It was a most welcome sight. They dismounted and began firing at the enemy. The enemy launched its most significant mortar attack thus far. The Marines departed their positions in the graveyard for a rally point in a small field. A jeep was observed traveling from east to west, and the passenger, PFC J.A. Thomas (1/11 FDC), was wounded and sitting upright in the seat. Towards the rear, PFC Dowell (1/11) was trying to stabilize and bandage Cpl Martin’s (1/11 supply) wounds. PFC Dowell was calling for a “corpsman up.” Other nearby Marines told him to hold on as the corpsman was working on another wounded Marine. Finally the corpsman arrived, and the Marines who were with him carried the wounded Marine whom he had been working on and placed him in the front seat of the truck closest to them. The wounded Marine was PFC Reyes, who was unconscious with a field dressing covering his eyes. The wounded were being placed in the back of that truck, and two grunts were observed helping a helmetless PFC Rooks (1/11 supply) to the vehicle, where he collapsed and was placed on the back of the vehicle. The Marines checked the nearby area for other wounded Marines, and someone noticed that one of the Marines was still in the graveyard and waving his arms. The corpsman mounted a jeep, and the jeep and the Ontos drove to the Marine in the graveyard position. The Ontos began giving covering fire with its organic .30 caliber 1919A4 Browning machinegun. Two Marines ran to that position and grabbed the wounded Marine and unceremoniously tossed him in the back of the jeep. They then ran back to rejoin the Marines at the trucks, and they were screaming that the NVA were coming. The convoy started moving. LCpl Johnson was driving one of the jeeps and noticed that LCpl Taylor was still walking. He stopped and told LCpl Taylor to get on. The jeep was full with a wounded PFC Moore (1/11) in the passenger’s seat and the corpsman and the wounded Marine (from the graveyard) in the back seat. Taylor jumped onto the hood and hung on to the windscreen. The Ontos started to follow the jeep when two Marines still on foot jumped onto the Ontos and the vehicle departed. Taylor hung on for dear life as the jeep sped forward. LCpl Johnson drove the jeep and talked on the radio simultaneously. The rear was checked, and no Marines were visible. They were the last vehicle to depart the area. The jeep finally caught up with the truck carrying the wounded Marines and passed it. The rear of the convoy came to a bridge bypass where a jeep was stopped and two Marines were waving the vehicles on. The remainder of the trip to the Rock Crusher was uneventful. When the convoy arrived the wounded were triaged and awaited medevac. The Marines of the convoy had run out of ammunition and water and had not eaten all day. They were tired and hungry, and they began to count their causalities. WO Peterson was debriefing some of the Marines, and it was noted that Cpl Heckman could not be accounted for. Eight NVA were confirmed as killed in action (KIA), and one was now a prisoner of war. All told, causalities were considered light for the intensity of the ambush, with seven Marines wounded in action (WIA) and one Marine missing in action. The precious cargo that the convoy delivered to the Rock Crusher would go on to kill an untold number of North Vietnamese soldiers and save the lives of countless Marines battling to break the stranglehold that the Communist forces held on the city of Hue. 4 February 1968 Having stood guard at the Rock Crusher for several days after their harrowing trip from Phu Bai on 1 February, the remaining convoy security forces and vehicles were ordered to return to Phu Bai. Most of the members of 1/11 who rode on the convoy were from critical job specialties within 11th Marines Headquarters Battery, and their prolonged stay at the Rock Crusher resulted in critical shortages of personnel to conduct routine unit business. Getting back onto those vehicles and running the gauntlet of enemy fire was on everyone’s mind. The convoy assembled and rolled out of the Rock Crusher. The convoy passed the bypass in the road, and to its right flew a Viet Cong flag on a pole next to a hut. The hair rose up on the back of the necks of the Marines. From their previous experience on 1 February, the Marines waited for an enemy ambush that they knew would be imminent. Tension was high; eyes looked down the barrels of their M16 rifles, but the firefight was not forthcoming. Many on the convoy felt that they should stop and conduct a search for Cpl Heckman,* but WO Peterson realized that this request would be asking for more trouble, so the convoy proceeded onward without stopping. Not a shot was fired. The convoy came to Provincial Route 1, turned right or to the south and headed for the safety of Phu Bai and the Marine combat base. Upon arriving in Phu Bai, Marines who were deemed critical to the function of 1/11 were forbidden from going on any more convoy security details. 7 February 1968 The battle for Hue was now in its 8th day. Fighting raged in the streets, and the NVA formations were slowly but surely being decimated and driven from the city. The cost in Marine lives was high, but the cost in lives to the NVA was staggering. The application of combined Marine combat arms and the fighting spirit of the Marine infantry units made the NVA realize that they were no match for the Marines in this conventional warfare environment. This was one fight that the Communists could not convolute into a victory. In Phu Bai that morning the word was passed that a convoy would be taking critical supplies to a remote fire base south of Hue. Marines of Headquarters, 2/5 were volunteering for convoy security duty. With the personnel shortages that the battalion was facing from the harsh, bitter fighting raging in Hue, the security detail was augmented with clerks, supply personnel, and even band members. Marines from 1/11 and 2/5 boarded 20 vehicles and were escorted by 2 Ontos. About 65 Marines were in this convoy as it departed Phu Bai at 0830 and rolled north on Provincial Route 1 in the direction of Hue. The highway was clogged with civilian refugees who were fleeing the fighting in and around Hue. The going was slow, but the forward progress was steady. The convoy turned west onto a dirt road and proceeded without incident to the Rock Crusher. At the Rock Crusher the situation was copasetic—artillery pieces firing all day and all night, combat patrolling, improving fighting positions, and building bunkers. The convoy pulled into the Rock Crusher, and the cargo was unloaded and stowed away. When this task was completed some of the convoy vehicles were to remain at the Rock Crusher and some of the security personnel would also remain. The convoy commander was Capt R. Brown (1/11 supply). Co C, 1/1 and B/9Eng were advised of the departure and asked if they had any vehicles that they wanted to attach to the convoy for the return trip to Phu Bai. B/9 Eng was running critically low on food stuffs and had a number of people who were going on rest and recuperation (R&R) or dental and some who would just be riding along for additional security. Co B was to attach five vehicles to the rear of the convoy. Twenty-five vehicles would be on the road for the return trip to Phu Bai. Sgt Smith (1st Antitank Company, 1st Tanks) would lead off in his Ontos, with Capt Brown following behind in his command jeep. The remainder of the vehicles would be trailed by Sgt Prather’s Ontos with GySgt W. Moore (1/11) in the trail radio jeep. The convoy departed around 1330. As the Co B dump trucks fell in behind the departing convoy, the last of their trucks sat idling. This truck contained Sgt Robbins, riding shotgun; HM3 Jerry Collier, one of the two Co B corpsmen; Pvt “Link” Lindquist; and Sgt Peter Hedlund (the Swede). The driver of the vehicle was to be LCpl Borkowski, but he was nowhere in sight. The Swede waited impatiently at the driver’s open door and watched the convoy drive off until it was out of sight. Impatience turned into worry and then anger at the thought of missing this movement and not making it to Phu Bai for this critical resupply mission. The burly Swede was the Co B cook, and he was not about to let his Marines go hungry. The Swede looked for Borkowski again, and when Borkowski was nowhere to be seen, the Swede jumped into the truck and sped off to catch the convoy. Borkowski appeared a short time later and was in disbelief. His vehicle was gone. Borkowski had been plagued that morning with stomach problems. The convoy reached the pontoon bridge crossing the Perfume River, and the trail Ontos and the radio jeep fell in behind it as it turned to the north on Route 549. The convoy traveled about 3 miles until it came to the easterly turn that would take it through to Route 547 and on to Route 1. At this time the convoy approached the bridge bypass with a village and a Viet Cong flag flying from a pole next to a hut. Most of the convoy rolled past, but a vehicle near the end of the convoy stopped to take down the flag. Small arms fire erupted, and the vehicles took some battle damage from this fire as they began to move off again. The last truck was stopped along with the Ontos, and the radio jeep with GySgt Moore raced around them and proceeded forward. The Co B truck and the A–13 Ontos were racked by mortar and machinegun fire, rocket propelled grenades, 57mm recoilless rifle fire, small arms fire from AK–47s, and NVA sappers throwing handgrenades and satchel charges (composition 4 high explosives) at the vehicles. At 1400 in the vicinity of YD760189, the first truck in the convoy hit a command-detonated mine in the road stopping that vehicle. Cpl Melton (1/11) and the other occupants of that truck quickly climbed aboard the second truck that was behind them. That vehicle pushed the disabled vehicle to the side of the narrow roadway and proceeded to follow Capt Brown and the Ontos. They made a hard right-hand turn to the east and entered into an NVA horseshoe ambush at YD767191 (roughly the same location as the 1 February ambush) in the graveyard. The horseshoe or U-shaped ambush gave the NVA fields of fire from both flanks and to the front of the convoy. The second truck (now the lead truck) was stopped by recoilless rifle fire. Capt Brown’s jeep was stopped, and PFC Shingleton (driving) was killed. At 1405 artillery fire was requested, but the exact position of the enemy could not be established. Capt Brown dismounted his jeep and climbed aboard the Ontos to direct fires. The captain was hit numerous times by small arms fire and killed. The lead Ontos drove through the ambush, turned around, and advanced back to the front of the convoy firing its .30 caliber machinegun and one recoilless round at the enemy. Then this Ontos was stopped by recoilless rifle fire and NVA sappers running up to it and throwing satchel charges onto and under the vehicle. Most of the remaining vehicles were disabled, and the officers and Marines aboard them were either killed or wounded. LCpl Alex Ruiz, a mortarman with 1/1, found himself on the ground next to the vehicle on which he was riding. He suffered almost crippling wounds, and to make matters worse, his rifle had been shattered by shrapnel from the same NVA mortar round that had wounded him. He looked to his side and saw a fallen Marine’s abandoned .45 caliber pistol lying on the roadway. Ruiz picked up the pistol in time to see an NVA rushing at him between the trucks. Ruiz shot him and crawled to a position in the graveyard where a machinegun team had set up a base of fire. The heavy volume of NVA fire directed at the Marines dictated the presence of at least one NVA company and possibly two. The NVA could be seen everywhere. The fighting was at close quarters, and sometimes the combat was hand to hand. NVA muzzle flashes pinpointed hundreds of NVA positions, both in the graveyard and in the tree line, and all the while mortars rained down on the Marines.
At the bypass, where the Ontos and the Swede’s truck were stopped, the front of the convoy was more than a mile distant from that location. The Marines on the truck dismounted the vehicle, and all were wounded during a mortar barrage. They dove into a ditch on the south side of the road and attempted to return fire. The Ontos fired its .30 caliber machinegun and was silenced by a devastating attack from a recoilless rifle position inside of a roadside hut. PFC Bierele was killed while exiting the vehicle to load the tubes. Sgt Prather died while manning the track’s machinegun. Mortar rounds dropped all around the two disabled vehicles. The Co B corpsman, HM3 Collier, was busy treating a wounded Pvt Lindquist, who was wounded in the legs. Sgt Robbins (going on R&R) was weaponless, so Collier gave Robbins his weapon and treated Robbins’ leg wounds. Collier’s biggest challenge would be in treating Sgt Hedlund. The Swede’s body was covered in small shrapnel wounds, and his body was partially exposed to enemy fire. Lindquist could see NVA firing at them from a culvert under the bridge. He decided to crawl along the ditch toward that position and silence the NVA who were firing at his fellow Marines. He hit several of them and advanced painfully to try to outflank them. He was wounded in his arms at this time, and although he was severely wounded, he could still fire his weapon. This was a life or death struggle.
In the middle of the convoy, Cpl Joe Tiscia (2/5 headquarters) was wounded and busy fighting his own battle with the NVA. Tiscia dismounted the vehicle that he was riding on and took up a position in the graveyard with an M60 machinegun crew. There was an NVA machinegun located to their front putting out a murderous volume of fire, sweeping the disabled vehicles and Marines on the roadway. Cpl Tiscia got up and advanced closer to that machinegun position and started hurling handgrenades at the NVA gunners. He ran out of grenades and called back to the graveyard Marines to throw him some of their grenades. He eliminated the NVA machinegun. This act inspired the remaining NVA around Tiscia to take their vengeance out on him. Cpl Morgan (2/5 headquarters) was shouting at Tiscia to rejoin him at the graveyard. Tiscia could see several NVA soldiers working their way around the rear of the vehicle where he was located. He had to hit the deck to avoid being hit by enemy fire. He was laying at the front of the disabled truck on the roadway when he noticed several sandaled feet on the other side of it advancing to the front of the vehicle. He fired under the truck hitting the NVA on the other side in the legs, causing the soldiers to fall. Tiscia then placed a controlled burst of fire into the fallen NVA. He heard a hissing sound, then a deafening explosion, and his next sensation was that of flying through the air. In the front of the convoy Cpl Melton was now badly wounded in his legs and arms, yet he was still capable of returning fire. Most of the Marines around his position were dead and ammunition was running low. At 1500 Cpl Melton looked up and noticed a very welcome sight, helicopter gunships. The area was overcast with low ceilings that caused the gunships to fly lower than they normally would. Two of them began making very low gun runs on the NVA positions. The NVA directed the majority of their ground fire to the skies, which resulted in both of the helicopters departing the area trailing smoke. With the greatest threat to the NVA limping back to Phu Bai, the NVA renewed their assault on the convoy in an attempt to eliminate the Marines who were still living. Near the rear of the second ambush site, with the main body of vehicles, Cpl Grant and LCpl Chellino (B/9 Eng) lay in a roadside ditch. Both had been driving trucks and had to dismount them when the convoy came to a halt. They returned NVA fire and could see countless muzzle flashes in what seemed like from all directions around their position. 1stSgt Gosse (B/9 Eng) was laying next to Chellino as Chellino returned fire at the “flashes.” Cpl Watkins (B/9 Eng) was forward of Chellino’s position and was disabled and no longer capable of firing his weapon after being shot through the left arm and right hand. It was badly wounded Marines lying helpless along the length of the convoy who made easy prey for the vengeful and murderous NVA. When the NVA came upon a wounded Marine whom they thought might live, they executed him. In the middle of the convoy Cpl Tiscia was regaining his senses. Tiscia could see spots and his ears were ringing. The first recognizable sound that he could make out was the bolt of a weapon being worked to clear a jam. Tiscia looked up to see that NVA being dropped by covering fire from the M60 position in the graveyard. NVA were dropping all around him now, and the Marines at the machinegun position were calling for him to join them. Tiscia crawled to the position, and two Marines cut his trousers off to place pressure bandages on the numerous wounds to his legs. About that time they also heard the sound of the helicopters and noticed that the helicopters didn’t loiter very long overhead. Then a Douglas A–1 Skyraider (1950s vintage propeller-driven attack aircraft) appeared and fired into the graveyard, keeping the heads of friend and foe alike down. It departed as fast as it appeared. The radio operators, officers and staff noncommissioned officers, were by now dead or too badly wounded to provide any effective leadership or support. Marine corporals and privates were now waging this battle. They were holding out but running out of ammunition. Reaction forces were being assembled in both Phu Bai and the Rock Crusher. The force coming from Phu Bai contained several vehicles and two U.S. Army M35A1 Quad 50s. The Quad 50s were equipped with four M2 Browning .50 caliber machineguns, mounted on the bed of a 2 ½-ton truck, and were primarily used for air defense (antiaircraft). When they were switched to the ground mode, the four .50 caliber machineguns were extremely devastating when used against infantry formations. The Quad 50s belonged to the Army’s Battery D, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery Regiment, and were commanded by 2LT R. Coates. A rolling artillery barrage preceded this force along its route to the second ambush site. The second reaction force was assembled at the Rock Crusher and comprised of Co C, 1/1; Co B, 1/11; and B/9 Eng. Their most significant organic weapon was the M2 Browning, mounted on the M63 antiaircraft mount and placed in the bed of a 2 ½-ton truck. LCpl Trial (B/9 Eng) manned this weapon. At the first ambush site, where the Ontos and the 9th Engineer truck were being overrun by the now swarming NVA, HM3 Collier was trying to treat the numerous wounds of Sgt Hedlund. Although Collier was also wounded, he ignored his wounds and exposed himself repeatedly to the withering enemy fire to try to save the life of this grievously wounded Marine. Pvt Lindquist had advanced to the flank of the culvert under the bridge and dispatched two more of the NVA with well-aimed rifle fire. Lindquist ignored his painful wounds and was still firing his weapon. He had crawled into a rice paddy to gain a better field of fire, looking down at his wounds and the “puddle” of blood surrounding him in the water. Lindquist thought that he would surely bleed to death. Just then he fired the last of his ammunition at the NVA under the bridge and resigned himself to his fate. His incapacitating wounds and empty weapon left him to the merciless NVA. It was then that he became aware of sloshing sounds coming toward him in the rice paddy. He took what he thought was going to be his last breath and placed his head under the water and feigned death. The NVA took his watch and his ring from his finger and, uncharacteristic of the NVA, moved off without finishing him off. The feint worked. What seemed like an eternity passed before Lindquist chanced raising his head to take another breath. He lay there motionless and listened to the sounds of someone moaning near the truck and then heard small arms fire and then silence. The NVA shot the Swede again and left him for dead. The shooting and explosions stopped and Lindquist could not hear any firing at his location or off in the distance. Cpl Melton, in the front of the convoy, could not believe his eyes when he saw a Quad 50 coming toward him from the direction of Route 1. As that Quad 50 approached his position, the NVA took it and the vehicles following it under fire. This fight wasn’t over just yet. The first Quad 50 opened up on the graveyard, and the crescendo of the four .50 caliber machineguns must have sounded like the devil’s organ to the NVA, as there was no protection from the rounds. The .50 caliber projectile could penetrate 11 ½ inches of reinforced concrete. For the first time the walls of the graves provided very little protection for the NVA. Other vehicles from the reaction force pulled up as the Marines dismounted, took the NVA under fire, and started to gather up the wounded and dead. Some of those relief Marines from Phu Bai would be killed and wounded in this fight. The second Quad 50 pulled up and added to the devastating fires of the first one. The first quad on the scene was weaving in and around the disabled vehicles on the roadway, engaging NVA targets as it passed by. It was then that 2LT Coates was wounded and died a short time later from his wounds.
The reaction force from the Rock Crusher was now approaching the scene of carnage at the first ambush site. They were shooting at any potential enemy positions. They came across the horrifically bloody scene at the Ontos and then the B/9 Eng truck and the bodies in the ditch. There was no return fire. The NVA had apparently abandoned the battlefield. They stopped and set about the grim task of loading the dead and wounded. Sgt Hedlund was barely clinging to life. Corpsman Knock began working on him, but the Swede would succumb to his wounds (on the hospital ship Repose). Near the bypass, Pvt Lindquist was found and bandaged and loaded aboard the waiting vehicles. Near the rear of the convoy, LCpl Chellino took the initiative and started shouting to turn the vehicles around that could still move and depart to the first ambush site. Grant, Chellino, and Campbell turned their vehicles around. The wounded and the dead were placed on them, and they drove off in the direction of the river. From behind them the first Quad 50 had negotiated the column of destroyed vehicles and was now coming up behind the trucks that were departing for the Rock Crusher. Cpl Grant looked ahead to see the reaction force from the Rock Crusher waiting at the first site, and for the first time that day he felt that he was going to make it out alive. Some of the Marines on the reaction force climbed aboard the vehicles providing covering fire. They stood on the running boards of the trucks holding on with one hand and firing their weapons with the other hand. LCpl Daly (B/9 Eng) was one of those Marines. It was nearly 1830 and getting dark when the Rock Crusher reaction force returned to the Rock Crusher. The wounded were staged for medevac by helicopter, and the KIAs were placed in a trailer for a later trip to U.S. Navy Support Activity Da Nang Mortuary, where the KIAs were prepared for shipment back to the United States. The setting at the Rock Crusher was very somber. The friends of the dead and wounded learned of their buddies’ fates. At the second ambush site the reaction force was still busy fighting and extricating the dead and wounded. They departed at 1845 and fought a running gun battle with the NVA through to Route 1. The reaction force turned south onto the paved surface of Route 1 and on to the security of the Phu Bai Combat Base. The Phu Bai reaction force didn’t make it back to Phu Bai until 2230 and began unloading the wounded at Charlie Medical Battalion. During the 7 February ambush the NVA took the lives of 20 Marines who were KIA and 39 more Marines who were WIA. The cost to the NVA in lives lost was not readily apparent. As darkness fell upon the graveyard, the Marines were busy clearing the area of the dead and wounded Marines, and an accurate count of NVA KIAs could not be conducted. One wounded NVA was taken prisoner. The road to the graveyard was indeed a very bloody footnote to the battle for Hue. >Authors’ Note: A special thanks to the contributors to this story and to their service to the United States of America and the U.S. Marine Corps—Sam Chellino, Tim Campbell, Don Grant, Leonard Lindquist, Howard Melton, Erle Plunkett, Ron Taylor, and Joe Tiscia, who all served during the action described in this article. *Cpl Heckman’s remains were recovered in March. |
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