NOVEMBER 2009 -- MajGen Richard C. Schulze Memorial Essay

What Pete Ellis Might Think About Today

Alternatives for Operation Plan 21

by LtCol F.G. Hoffman, USMCR(Ret)

>LtCol Hoffman is a defense analyst and frequent contributor to the Gazette.

A modern Maj “Pete” Ellis would have much to ponder today. Some aspects of the emerging strategic environment would look familiar. The world’s geography has not changed, although relevant strategic pivot points have. In particular, the geoeconomics and political shift in power toward the Pacific and Indian Oceans would be recognized.1 He would readily grasp the geostrategic issues posed by key trade and energy routes of the Persian Gulf, the Straits of Malacca, and the South China Sea. The importance of these critical chokepoints on the international economic and energy distribution system is too obvious. Ellis would also have to factor in the fact that the United States depends on oil imports for roughly 70 percent of its needs, and that 80 percent of the oil supply could be in the hands of unstable or autocratic states. The modernization of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could not be glossed over either.

However, Ellis would not simply dust off Operation Plan 712, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, with a Chinese update. Major trends like the sharp rise in urbanization and immigration, especially in Africa and Asia, could not be ignored. The majority of the world now lives in dense urban centers with intense implications regarding governance, employment, and stability in these teeming megacities.

The new threat posed by nuclear proliferation and the unique challenges posed by transnational threats would have to be factored in; so too, the emergence of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups seeking to disrupt the Middle East with their vision of radical Islam. The diffusion of advanced conventional capabilities to groups like Hezbollah, making them able to defeat (or at least produce a draw against) Western powers, may also have to be factored in. The impact of these factors on the security of the homeland could not be ignored given the tragedy of 11 September 2001 (9/11).

Thus Pete Ellis would have his plate full were he to advise the Commandant on how the Corps should adapt to such a world. In the 1920s things were simpler. Ellis focused on one driver, Japan’s ambitions, and he got it right. But today we live in a more complex world. What drivers should be considered now if we are to retain our role as the Nation’s “force-in-readiness”? What world and what missions are we really ready for? Those are the general questions that this essay seeks to stimulate debate over.2

Alternative Scenario Planning

In such an uncertain world, some might contend that planning is impossible and that all we can do is adapt or react after some crisis emerges. As 9/11 and the current fiscal crisis indicate, we do not have a great track record for predicting major discontinuities. Quite frankly, despite legions of strategists, intelligence cells, and planners, we generally fail in anticipating the sudden nonlinear changes that routinely characterize human events.

Surprise is not a function of the absence of warning or information. It is rarely a function, as Donald H. Rumsfeld has suggested, of the unknowns or unknowable. Many possible discontinuities have roots in ongoing measurable trends, and we can anticipate them through various strategic planning exercises. Strategic planning serves to overcome complacency and blinders that retard adaptation and create the conditions for surprise.3 By realizing what today’s driving forces are, we can “reperceive” our current mental model of what the Marine Corps is and what it provides the Nation in order to examine alternatives with their anticipated consequences. (See Table 1.)

There is a three-step planning process used by the Pentagon and by the American intelligence community for thinking anew and avoiding major shocks. The first step is to identify and monitor the driving forces that influence tomorrow’s world—get ahead of the so-called inevitable surprises. The limits of human perception and the ability to objectively evaluate one’s current environment, much less the future, is fraught with problems, but it is necessary to avoid turning into a proverbial “boiling frog” where the slowly rising water temperature lulls the frog to sleep.

The second step is to remove the rigid mental paradigms about what is fixed and what can be changed in the landscape. This is best done by senior leaders participating in facilitated scenario-based exercises (like those discussed in the central portion of this essay). The final step is to envision new strategies and the resulting changes in the institution for dealing with new circumstances.

In strategic planning, scenarios serve senior leaders the same purpose of campaign design in the sense that it helps frame the whole problem. Like campaign design, strategic scenarios help the decisionmakers appreciate potential paths and where uncertainty and risk exist. Their purpose is to reframe the mental model we all have about our understanding of how the world operates and how our organization plays within that world.

The scenarios pose a range of different futures for exploration. This process clarifies the risks that standing still poses, while revealing potential missions and opportunities. The intent behind such a process is to encourage diversity of views and learning about the future. Traditional planning methodologies generally postulate slow linear extrapolations from the present. In contrast, scenario planning, when done properly, can prepare organizations to anticipate an evolving environment the way that Ellis did in the 1920s.

One can see many historical cases where military organizations clung to their pasts and institutional rituals and missed out on opportunities. What if Operation Plan 712 had been summarily dismissed in the prewar era, and the lessons of Gallipoli were etched in stone? Could Guadalcanal have become the end of the Marine Corps instead of a tipping point in the greatest war of the 20th century?

Senior leaders too often are busy or skeptical about the need to broaden the “strategic intelligence preparation of the battlespace” into unfamiliar ground. Too often we confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable or the very unlikely and create the conditions for strategic surprise. Thus a modern-day Pete Ellis would think out of the box and develop a set of scenarios to test our current posture against plausible futures we have not yet thoroughly explored. The principal drivers selected for this “thought experiment” include:

• China’s rise as an economic and military power.

• Failed states rate and impact of numerous ungoverned areas.

• Nonstate violent extremism.4

These drivers exist along the axes of a strategic planning space presented in Figure 1. Each driver produces a scenario that ranges from benign or low impact out to a high impact or very volatile environment. For example, the rising China scenario could produce a situation ranging from benign competition out to an extremely competitive context, called the Red Dragon Rising. The total box represents a range of alternative worlds, and the potential exists for combinations at each of the corners of the planning box. Each would require distinctly different Marine capability sets and possibly radically different force structures. All three of these scenarios represent potential operating environments for the year 2025.

Today’s Marine Corps force posture covers a section of this planning space—some areas better than others. The question for our 21st century Pete Ellis is whether or not it is well postured to cover the risks presented by the far edges of the planning space. Operation Plan 712 postured the Corps for one scenario, but the modern Ellis has to consider a dynamic environment and cover a range of threats.

China’s Rise

This scenario addresses the rise (or reemergence) of great power tensions in the Pacific. China’s rise, measured in political, economic, and military terms, could be the single most significant geopolitical event in the 21st century. Its steadily improving military power throws a dark cloud over the Pacific. In particular, its activities in space, cyberwarfare, and naval modernization are acute concerns. China’s stability is tied to steady economic growth, which is dependent upon access to critical resources, especially energy, or it will implode. China will go to great lengths to ensure its internal stability and the preservation of the current regime.

Today the People’s Republic of China’s military capabilities remain focused on Taiwan and improving its defensive or sea denial capabilities.5 But in this future scenario, Taiwan has been absorbed within greater China, and the PLA extends its capabilities to secure the Middle Kingdom’s vulnerable lines of communications and demands for secure energy resources. China’s ability to project and sustain power at a distance is no longer limited. It creates a modern power projection fleet including three mid-sized carriers, a modest surface fleet, and a large, long-range submarine force. It also has acquired sizable bases in Iran, Pakistan, Africa, and Latin America as well. It uses its military power to secure its foreign energy investments and aggressively defends its sea lanes of communications against disruption. China proves to be extremely aggressive at sea and is allied with Iran against the United States and the West. As a result, our own access to the global commons is increasingly at risk, and so are trade flows to and from major American allies like Japan. American interests are threatened in places like the Persian Gulf and the Pacific and Indian Oceans.6 Instead of mirror imaging this clash of interests into a titanic Midway redux circa 2025 or a missile duel off of China’s seaboard, this scenario anticipates more indirect contests with proxies and Chinese allies in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.7

In this possible world, the corresponding response by a 21st century Gen Ellis might logically be to provide a power projection Marine Corps. The need to conduct power projection operations from the sea in this context could be extremely vital to U.S. interests. The power projection force would focus on being able to conduct forcible entry operations at great distances from the United States in many areas of the world.

Such a force would generate strategic advantages that accrue to the United States from its possession of a robust amphibious power projection capability. The ability to conduct powerful joint forcible entry operations at a time and place of our choosing produces a credible deterrent against possible PLA aggressors. This deterrent is more lasting than just the impact of power projection by strike or long-range precision fires because it threatens regime survival or the seizure of something the adversary holds dear.

A power projection Marine Corps would, as a minimum, be set at three complete Marine divisions. Four would be preferable. Each division would have a full complement of reconnaissance, tank, amphibious assault, and light armor battalions. The artillery regiment would be comprised of five battalions, including a high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) battalion to provide deep area fires.

The full-programmed acquisition level of 1,013 expeditionary fighting vehicles (EFVs) would be procured. The EFV provides Marine assault elements with better operational and tactical mobility both in the water and ashore. Once ashore EFVs provide Marines with an armored personnel carrier designed to meet future threats, including those with weapons of mass destruction.8

Likewise Marine aviation would have to be enlarged to some degree. In support of the forcible entry mission, the only shift would be augmenting F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) assets by three squadrons above the currently programmed level. The MV–22 tiltrotor Osprey would remain a key component of the aviation combat element (ACE) of any forcible entry Marine expeditionary force. The MV–22 program would be fully programmed for 420 aircraft in 18 squadrons.

The Marine Corps’ end strength would have to be increased to roughly 215,000 to account for the extra tank, light armor, EFV, and HIMARS units. A robust amphibious fleet able to lift the assault echelons of three Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) with no less than 48 L-class ships would be required to adequately support American interests in this scenario. Additionally, the U.S. Navy would have to rectify its perennial shortfalls in naval surface fires and mine warfare. (See Figure 2.)

‘Perfect Storm’ of Failed States

In this scenario the principal driver is failed states and urban chaos. At its extreme range, as predicted by the National Intelligence Council in a long-range assessment, a perfect storm emerges. “Weak governments, lagging economies, religious extremism, and youth bulges,” the intelligence community warned, “will align to create a perfect storm for internal conflict in certain regions.”9 This perfect storm would be manifested the most in numerous failed states and large-scale civil disorder in major cities in the developing world. Some of the states, such as Mexico, could be close to home.10 Others in Africa or South Asia could be far away, and some of the failed states could include those possessing elements of a nuclear weapons program.

This scenario includes persistent chaos in the littorals and in ungovernable “feral cities.”11 This chaos would produce protracted armed stabilization missions all along the rim lands of the developing world. The sprawling and putrid slums of megacities in Africa and Asia would be the most frequent operating environment for the Marines.12 For this world the Corps would revert to its pre-World War II roots and exploit its impressive versatility and ethos to return to its small wars legacy. Some historians like Max Boot have urged this approach, noting that the “Marines are well-placed to play a leading role in this kind of irregular conflict, but to do so they will have to leave their glorious World War II heritage even further behind.”13 Arguably, in such a scenario, the Marine Corps could extend its well-founded legacy of warfighting excellence in small wars and its institutional agility for this new era. In its latest institutional vision and supporting strategy, the Marines now refer to this set of tasks as complex expeditionary operations and have labeled it as a crucial new core competency.14

An emphasis on small wars could require alterations in the Marine Corps’ basic structure. The basic Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) should be retained, although it may be better organized into more modular Marine brigade-sized components. Ground units may be further adapted to provide specific expertise. One option would be to retain 24 infantry battalions, but divide them into 12 infantry battalions and 12 stability battalions. The infantry battalions would be masters of urban warfare, with frequent opportunities to train in this demanding operational environment at the world’s best training site. The latter would be more specialized units that would regularly rotate into the Marine component at U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom) to support joint operations beyond special operations force’s capabilities.

Instead of heavy assets like tanks, long-range rocket systems, and amphibious assault craft, the Marines would be substantially lighter and more mobile. Plans for future replacements for the M1A1 main battle tank and the EFV would be scrapped. The EFV is perfect for the forcible entry Marine Corps but inadequate for tactical maneuver during small wars. A new light armored vehicle (LAV) program would have to be initiated—something between the existing LAV and an urban fighting vehicle (UFV).15

A Marine Corps focused on small wars would also require the Marines to create new units to address specific capability shortfalls, adding information warfare (IW) battalions to significantly upgrade the Marine psychological operations capability, security cooperation or foreign military training units, and active civil affairs battalions. The IW battalions would help the MAGTF commander excel in the “theater” of operations, with MAGTF commanders excelling as “dueling producers.”16 Such capabilities, which could be organized into a “combined actions regiment,” are very relevant to these “savage wars of peace.” A dedicated training and advisory capacity would be stood up.17

This is a Marine Corps that would seek to apply itself in interagency task forces.18 Other capabilities, including intelligence assets like human exploitation teams and analysts, would remain at the same overall level but would be decentralized within tactical units at the infantry battalion level to increase those organizations’ depth for 24/7 operations. Recent operational experience highlights the rapid exploitation of actionable intelligence at lower and lower levels in counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. The ground units would have more intelligence analysts and “hobbits” at the company level.19 The enhanced company operations concept would be fully implemented and extended to the MAGTF level.20

Reorienting the Marines for small or complex irregular wars would logically require a somewhat different ACE as well. The most significant difference would be reduced buys of the MV–22 Osprey. The complexity of this hybrid machine, half aircraft and half helicopter, does not bring desirable operational characteristics to a small wars Marine Corps. Some may be required since the speed and self-deployability of the Osprey make it a superb platform for special operations, and thus the Marine aviation component devoted to USSOCom would be the only Marine unit that would employ this aircraft. The Marines would rely upon some other traditional and much more affordable medium-lift helicopter for their extensive involvement in urban areas. The ACE would include an unmanned aviation group, reflecting a sharp increase in unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) by the Marine Corps.

Given the training and education pipeline required to provide the intellectual agility, culture and language acuity, and rigorous unit training, more personnel (and a slightly older force) would actually be required.21 A substantial increase in officer and enlisted education programs would be needed, necessitating an order of magnitude increase to Marine Corps University.22 Thus an active duty end strength of 190,000 to 195,000 Marines is recommended for the small wars Corps.

Violent Extremism

The final alternative vision of the future will be very familiar to Marines.23 The principal driver in this scenario is violent extremism that emanates from anti-Western and antiglobalization sentiments. It is fanned by the collapse of longstanding social systems in the Middle East and could be aggravated by deep economic instability arising in the undeveloped world. At its extreme edge, numerous nonstate groups and superempowered individuals use violence to create and sustain their own political and ideological agendas.

This option builds a Marine Corps uniquely prepared for the world of fifth-generation warfare (5GW). It is hard to ignore the evolution of what is commonly called 4GW now.24 Today’s “long war” makes the proponents of 4GW appear prophetic. The proponents of this concept correctly captured the rise of nonstate actors, the confluence or blurring of civilian and military spheres, and the salience of culture and popular will. They also predicted the intensity of this new form of conflict and our relative vulnerability.25

In this scenario, called the “5GW clash,” our adversaries are networked and create violent events to convey tailored messages to enemy policymakers over a protracted period. They exploit a full spectrum of political, social, economic, and military networks through a mix of transnational and subnational actors.26 5GW will be marked by the increased power of smaller and smaller groups and the explosion of biotechnology.27

In the 5GW clash scenario, the nexus of violent al-Qeada associates, Islamic extremists, and transnational criminal organizations comes full circle. At the extreme range, it represents a return to the Middle Ages.28 Large, violent gangs have proliferated throughout the developed world, with no compunction about urban violence. Nonstate actors possess weapons of mass destruction and have successfully employed them. Several states in Africa and South Asia are virtually ungoverned. The U.S. economy has suffered a steep decline after the collapse of its car and banking industries.

Threats closer to home take greater precedent. America suffered three acts of catastrophic terrorism after 2012. The first was a series of mysterious airplane crashes, which killed only 500 citizens but sharply curtailed the transportation sector in the U.S. economy. A number of small anthrax attacks took place in U.S. cities. The anthrax was genetically modified to produce small but hardy spores that lasted much longer in the air than traditional forms, which increased its deadly effect. Finally, a major radiological or “dirty” bomb occurred at the major oil refinery at Long Beach, CA. Given its severe economic crisis, and the government’s need to husband resources while dealing with extraordinarily disruptive threats to the homeland and our way of life, the traditional roles of the U.S. military could be substantially revised.29

The posture of the Corps would be extensively altered in such an environment. Its force-in-readiness role would come to the fore, but its application would be equally distributed between homeland security tasks and overseas missions. The Marine Corps would be a major force provider to Northern Command to support the Department of Homeland Security. The National Guard, which had been devoted to being an operational reserve and fulfilling rotational deployments to Korea and Europe, is not seen as a viable homeland security solution as a part-time entity. In this world, the Guard’s role is limited since so many local law enforcement, public safety, and medical personnel could not be in Guard units and activated without impacting local government.

Thus, in this alternative world, MEBs would be routinely allocated to border security, critical infrastructure protection, and urban stability operations in the continental United States as well as overseas. In this scenario the Marine Component to USSOCom would be reinforced with extensive command and control, intelligence, aviation, and logistics augmentation relative to today’s small contingent.

As in the small wars Marine Corps, the Operating Forces would be organized into six permanent MAGTFs of brigade size and a single Marine expeditionary force/force readiness command headquarters. The ground combat element (GCE) of five brigades would be comprised of an infantry battalion, a military police battalion, and a chemical-biological incident response force (CBIRF). The infantry battalion would be trained in urban security operations and follow a training program similar to today’s fleet antiterrorism security team program. Ground mobility would be largely by a new UFV. These vehicles would include sophisticated weapons of mass destruction detection sensors. The Corps would not field any tank or EFV assets or any artillery forces. The USSOCom brigade GCE would be comprised of two special operations “raider” battalions to support missions against adversary sanctuaries and training infrastructure.

The ACE would rely extensively on rotary-wing (RW) assets, plus AC–130s, and numerous UASs. UASs would be common in all four elements of the MAGTF. In fact, the Corps would be a leader in unmanned and exoskeleton systems. The Marines would rely more on CV–22s for long-range missions and increased responsiveness. But some other helicopter is required and would be fielded for rapid insertion in urban environments.

The end strength for such a force could be in the 180,000 range. The Corps would have a number of naval detachments and extensive riverine/boat units but would not have responsibilities for forcible entry or regular amphibious deployments, and thus the amphibious fleet total would be no more than 18 amphibious ships. A notional force structure for the 5GW Marine Corps is depicted in Table 2.

Conclusion

The alternative futures presented here pose widely divergent challenges to the Nation’s “9–1–1 force.” They are intended as an intellectual exercise and a catalyst. They raise questions about what it means to be the Nation’s force-in-readiness—questions that beg serious answers.30 Should Operation Plan 21 posture the Corps for a single driver or strike a balance between several potential futures? What is that balance or focal point?

This essay has not answered that challenge, but it has posed three stark alternatives. Each alternative Marine Corps supports a plausible future and details some implications of that future on our Operating Forces. None of these singular worlds is likely, but each of these worlds could occur. Perhaps elements of all three worlds will emerge. Arguably they already have. These alternatives frame the planning space a modern Ellis must consider. Our current Marine Corps falls somewhere within this planning space as a total capability package. There are several questions that we need to answer. Are we postured where we can best respond to the relative probabilities of the scenario or merely the ones we want to prepare for? Are we sitting in our comfort zone or really leaning forward as the world’s premier expeditionary force? Where is our Ellis asking us, “Will we be prepared for what’s next”?31 That question should be a catalyst for a modern Pete Ellis or the next strategic vision group.

Notes

1. Kaplan, Robert D., “Center Stage for the Twenty-First Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009, pp. 16–32.

2. Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr., “Competing for the Future: Searching for Major Ellis,” Marine Corps Gazette, November 1996, pp. 28–37.

3. Schwartz, Peter, Inevitable Surprises: Thinking Ahead in a Time of Turbulence, Gotham, New York, 2003, p. 4.

4. In addition to Peter Schwartz on the utility of scenarios, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century, Bantam, New York, 2009, pp. 14–21.

5. On emerging Chinese maritime capabilities, see David Lei, “China’s New Multi-Faceted Maritime Strategy,” Orbis, Winter 2008, pp. 139–157 and Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, “Command of the Sea With Chinese Characteristics, Orbis, Fall 2005, pp. 677–694. On PLA investments in power projection, see Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma,” Naval War College Review, Autumn 2006, pp. 13–45.

6. Peters, Ralph, New Glory: Expanding America’s Global Supremacy, Sentinel, New York, 2005; Robert D. Kaplan, “The Revenge of Geography,” Foreign Policy, May/June 2009.

7. For a more conventional scenario employing advanced missile, space, and cyber assets, see Andrew F. Krepinevich’s “Assassin’s Mace” scenario in 7 Deadly Scenarios, pp. 169–209.

8. Contrary to some criticisms of the EFV program, see Andrew F. Krepinevich’s article, “Wasting Assets,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009.

9. National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future, Report of the 2020 Project, Washington, DC, December 2004, available at http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020_es.html.

10. A potential raised in the Joint Forces Command’s annual long-range assessment, The Joint Operational Environment 2008, Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, VA, November 2008, pp. 35–36.

11. Norton, Richard, “Feral Cities,” Naval War College Review, Newport, RI, Autumn, 2003.

12. For more details, see the scenario titled, “Collapse of Pakistan,” in Krepinevich’s 7 Deadly Scenarios, pp. 3–62.

13. Boot, Max, “The Corps Should Look to Its Small Wars Past,” Armed Forces Journal International, April 2004, p. 30.

14. Conway, Gen James T., Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), Washington, DC, 2008, p. 16.

15. For different perspectives on the contribution of these programs, see Dakota Wood, “The US Marine Corps: Fleet Marine Forces for the 21st Century,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, Washington, DC, November 2008.
16. Smith, Rupert, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Knopf, New York, 2006, pp. 286–287.

17. Cuomo, Capt Scott A., “Embedded Training Teams,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 2006, pp. 62–68; John A. Nagl, “Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps,” Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC, June 2007.

18. Bogdanos, Col Matthew, USMCR, “Interagency Operations: The Marine Specialty of This Century,” Marine Corps Gazette, March 2006, pp. 60–65.

19. Swickard, Joe, “Armed With Computers and Data About the Enemy: ‘The Hobbits’ Are Key to Success in Iraq,” Houston Chronicle, 15 December 2006, p. 1.

20. Conway, Gen James T., A Concept for Enhanced Company Operations, HQMC, Washington, DC, 28 August 2008.

21. Vandergriff, Donald E., Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal With the Changing Face of War, CDI Press, Washington, DC, 2006, pp. 77–111.

22. Wilhelm, Gen Charles E., USMC(Ret), et al., U.S. Marine Corps Officer Professional Military Education 2006 Study and Findings, Marine Corps University, Quantico, 29 September 2006.

23. Lind, Williams S., Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary I. Wilson, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989, pp. 22–26 and Col Thomas X. Hammes, USMC(Ret), “Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves Into a Fourth Generation,” Strategic Forum, No. 135, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, January 2005.

24. McKenzie, Kenneth F., “Elegant Irrelevance: Fourth Generation Warfare,” Parameters, Autumn, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1993, pp. 51–60.

25. For a comprehensive review of 4GW literature, see Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp, Regina Karp, eds., Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict: Debating Fourth-Generation Warfare, Routledge, London, 2007.

26. Hammes, Col Thomas X., USMC(Ret), The Sling and Stone, Regency, St. Paul, MN, 2004.

27. Hammes, Col Thomas X., USMC(Ret), “Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges,” Military Review, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May-June 2007, p. 23.

28. Williams, Phil, From the New Middles Ages to a New Dark Age: The Decline of the State and U.S. Strategy, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, June 2008, p. 1.

29. Elements of this scenario could include aspects from two of Dr. Krepinevich’s 7 Deadly Scenarios, “War Comes to America” and “War on the Global Economy,” pp. 63–90 and 210–245, respectively, and LtCol Stanton S. Coerr, “Fifth-Generation Warfare: Warfare Versus the Nonstate Actor,” Marine Corps Gazette, January 2009.

30. Munson, Maj Peter J., “A Force-in-Readiness…for What?” Marine Corps Gazette, February 2009, pp. 57–59.

31. Cuomo, Capt Scott A., “Will We Be Prepared for What’s Next?” Marine Corps Gazette, July 2007, pp. 6–9.

The MajGen Richard C. Schulze Memorial Essay honors the memory of the Marine Corps general officer for whom it is named. MajGen Schulze, a native of Oakland, CA, died in November 1983, 2 years after his retirement. An enlisted Marine at the time of his commissioning in 1951, he earned his B.A. in Far East history from Stanford University in 1954 and later earned an M.S. in public administration from George Washington University (1971).

He was a mortar section leader with the 1st Marines in Korea and commanded 3d Battalion, 3d Ma?rines in Vietnam. MajGen Schulze served as director of three different divisions within the Manpower Department at Headquarters. He also served as Inspector General of the Marine Corps and as Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego. He was a frequent contributor to the Gazette and wrote with philosophical insight on many of the intractable problems confronting the Armed Forces—thus the naming of this annual essay in his honor is singularly appropriate.

The Schulze Memorial Essays have been published each year since 1984. They are made possible by the earnings of an endowment fund established by friends of MajGen Schulze. Authors of the essays are chosen by the Editorial Board of the Gazette.