MARCH, 1942

An Aerial Blitzkrieg in Miniature

By LtCol Vernon E. Megee

TIME was, and not so long ago at that, when the subject of small wars was professionally dear to the soul of the Marine officer. Minor operations against irregular forces has long been the forte of our Corps, and save for the interlude with the Second Division in France, our Corps history reads like a tactical treatise on the opeerations of comparatively small groups in difficult climes and terrain. However, these last two years, with their frantic expansion and planning for "the big picture," have put the banana lighters definitely in the shade in favor of armored columns, parachutists, and full scale streamlined divisions. Our military journals are concerned only with the minutae of making war in the grand manner; many of our junior officers speak only the language of landing operations and defense battalions. Lest we forget our ancient and honored role completely, perhaps it might be wise to pause and reflect on what is happening today to the concepts of small war tactics.

During the recent brief but violent border fighting between Peru and Ecuador, there occurred a series of incidents which demonstrated rather effectively some modern methods of fighting a small war. There are worthy lessons to be drawn from these operations-lessons which begin where our Nicaraguan episode ended. It is believed that the record merits inspection.

On July 23, this year, after several months of tension along the Pernvian-Ecuadorean frontier and some isolated skirmishing between border guards, a full scale battle on a thirty kilometer front along the Zarumilla river began with the dawn. The number of troops engaged might have equalled a brigade on each side, fairly well equipped with rifles, machine guns and some field artillery. On the Peruvian side there was also a company or so of light tanks. The forces appeared to be fairly well matched-except for one significant fact. The Peruvians had a small air force; their opponents had none. The Peruvians also had control of the sea, which in this case was represented by the Gulf of Guayaquil.

During the growing period of tension preceding hostilities, the Peruvian fighting squadron belonging to the Northern Group based at Chiclayo was detached to an advanced airdrome at Talara, with an auxiliary field at Tumbes, some twenty kilometers behind the frontier. A cooperative squadron of five ancient English Fairey planes was attached directly to the Army command and based at Tumbes, which was the headquarters of the general commanding. The remainder of the Northern Group, consisting of a squadron of Caproni bombers and a squadron of single engine Caproni transports, remained at Chiclayo, alerted. The Peruvian Air Force, it might be said, is an independent organization, but in this instance the Army general commanding had been designated as supreme commander over all land, sea, and air forces in the northern area. Consequently, the air group was under his direct control, without further reference to air force headquarters in Lima. The Army general staff had not previously, in maneuvers, exercised this control, therefore, the initial employment of aviation was somewhat faulty, to say the least.

During the early stages of the battle, the Peruvian forces uncovered several strong points along the north bank of the Zarumilla River defended by machine guns, field artillery and Breda 20-mm. anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. Without waiting to bring their own artillery strength into full play, the Army command immediately called for air bombing of these front line positions. The lighting squadron commander dispatched a flight of American monoplane fighters, armed with fragmentation bombs, and thoroughly dive-bombed the Ecuadorean artillery positions. Due to poor weather conditions the fighters were forced to work at dangerously low altitudes, resulting in the loss of one of their number shot down by machine gun lire. Later in the day the Caproni bomber squadron coming up from Chiclayo also attacked these positions, the combined fire of air and ground forces serving to soften the defense so that the ground forces were able to cross the river at certain points. Considering that the Peruvian army had a definite artillery superiority, the reckless employment of their aviation forces against front line strong points seems hardly justified. Aviation is an expensive substitute for field artillery.

The air force headquarters in Lima then took a hand in the situation, transferring an air commander and staff to the frontier. The employment of air forces thereafter was more effective, being directed toward nerve centers on the Ecuadorean lines of communications.

As can be seen from the map, there were few usable roads on the Ecuadorean side, the principal line of supply being by boat to Puerto Bolivar, thence by rail to Machala and Santa Rosa. This was supplemented by a passable truck road from Cuenca to Machala, thence to Chacras on the frontier. Distribution of supplies from Chacras to the posts along the river to the right and left was by poor roads and trails parallel to the front. The country north of the frontier is thorny jungle scrub, difficult of passage save by the few roads and trails. Thus there existed a series of bottlenecks on the lines of communications offering opportunities for effective air action. The Peruvian aviators began bombing bridges on the highway, truck columns, the railroad stations in Machala and Santa Rosa, and gunboats and launches plying between Guayaquil and Puerto Bolivar. This went on for several days, effectively impeding the flow of supplies and reinforcement to the Ecuadoran troops.

Meanwhile the Peruvian land forces had made good their crossing of the Zarumilla River, driving their opponents out of the frontier villages of Huaquillas, Chacras, Quebracla Seca, and Rancho Chico. The Ecuadorean army fought a strong delaying action at Arenillas, then retreated into the jungle and dispersed into guerilla bands. The Peruvians followed, but immediately ran into the same sort of situation that confronted our patrols in the Nicaraguan campaign. They were ambushed at every turn of the trails. The thick scrub prevented any effective tactical maneuvering, so the Ecuadorean rear guard was able to inflict considerable punishment and delay on the pursuing columns. The tanks were of little use save on the roads.

It is quite possible that the Ecuadorean commander would have succeeded in falling back on his line of communications to the supplies he had stored along the railroad, and the campaign might have dragged on for months, save for a series of daring air actions which took a page out of the Blitzkrieg book of tactics and definitely ended the campaign in the space of a few hours. It is with this last day's operations, that this report is mainly concerned.

On July 31st, at about noon, five ancient Caproni transports of the type Mussolini used in Ethiopia, preceded by a flight of Northrop attack bombers, appeared to the southward of Santa Rosa coming in at low altitude. The transports landed without more ado, while the attack planes passed on to divert the garrison at Santa Rosa. Squads of air infantry, complete down to tommy guns, were spewed out as the lumbering Capronis came to rest. In a very few minutes the airdrome was taken and a strong holding force thrown out in the direction of the village. The Capronis took off for another journey to the accompaniment of a scattering fusillade of rifle shots. By the time the second wave of troops was disembarked, the Ecuadorean garrison, surprisingly weak, had fled, firing the village and abandoning their supplies. Santa Rosa was definitely in the hands of the Peruvian air force.

At 3:00 P.M. of the same day, the operation was repeated at Machala, the planes skimming along the railroad at minimum altitude, effecting a complete surprise. The field at Machala was nothing more than a dry lake bed, but the Capronis landed without incident, and with little or no opposition. Again they took off to the tune of scattered shots as the air infantry moved toward the town. Machala was poorly guarded, despite its importance, and was captured with but the loss of one man.

Meanwhile the Capronis had returned to Tumbes for another load. This time they headed for Puerto Bolivar where there was no landing field, again preceded by an escort of attack planes. The plaza at Puerto Bolivar was of the usual square block size. There was a thin ring of straggling thatch-roofed houses, the railroad station, and the dock. On three sides the jungle crowded close to the town; the fourth side was water. On the dock was a pair of 20-mm. Breda guns, supposedly manned. On the railroad sat three freight cars packed with a variety of military equipment. At 5:30 P.M. there was a sudden roar of motors, a rattle of machine gun fire as the attack planes flashed overhead. The section of lumbering Capronis droned over the village at less than a thousand feet. Parachutes suddenly blossomed, settled into the plaza with their wriggling cargoes. Again a few shots and the Peruvian air landing force had the situation well in hand. One parachutist stuck halfway through a thatch roof and had to be pulled out; otherwise there were no casualties. The garrison was captured intact-one sergeant, one corporal and four guardia civil.

The size of the garrison detailed to guard the majority of the Ecuadorean Army's reserve supplies is indicative of the measure of surprise effected by this operation. The number of parachutists might have been twenty-thirty at the most. A conservative estimate of the size of the garrison which might reasonably have been expected at Puerto Bolivar, considering its vital importance, would have been at least one infantry company with machine gun support. Thus the parachute attack should not have been expected to succeed-but it did. Truly, surprise is the essense of successful war.

There remained but some little mopping up along the railroad. Army troops moved into Santa Rosa and Machala by truck relieving the air forces. The Peruvian Navy occupied Puerto Bolivar. The Ecuadorean army melted away into the jungle, losing all contact with their opponents. Within twenty-four hours a truce was signed, ending hostilities.

Thus ended the first aerial blitzkrieg of the Western Hemisphere, minute in scale but of perfect proportions. The operations of the small Peruvian air force, comparable in size to our air force during the Nicaraguan campaign, may well be considered by future students of minor tactics as a classic example of the employment of air units in small wars.