A New Vision for the Reserve
Challenge Them
by Stephen J. Wilbanks
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>A former Marine sergeant, Mr. Wilbanks served as a military policeman on active duty as well as in the SMCR and IMA. He deployed for OIF 05–07 with Personnel Recovery and Processing, an SMCR unit. This article was his Chase Prize Essay Contest entry.
“Nasty reservists!” It’s a common refrain throughout the Marine Corps. My first exposure to it came at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island in 1992. I was an active duty recruit, but there were a few of the aforementioned in my platoon. From day one until graduation, the drill instructors mercilessly berated the Reserve recruits for their misguided choice in life. And so it went throughout my 4-year enlistment any time the subject of reservists came up. Never having had any firsthand experience with the Reserves, I was an indignant, cocksure active duty Marine, and I went right along with the party line.
After leaving active duty in 1996, I soon began to miss the Corps, but my commitments in life were such that returning to active duty was not a real option. With a contractual obligation until 1999, I was an easy sell for the prior-service recruiter, and soon thereafter I tacked the “R” onto the end of “USMC” after signing my rank and name. After a frustrating, disappointing year in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR), I transferred back to the Individual Ready Reserve and let my contract expire.
Hearing the bugle call once again, I reenlisted in 2005 in the SMCR and deployed for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 05–07 (OIF 05–07). Having the benefit of a lengthy break in service and exposure to numerous SMCR units, I am still left with the same conclusion that prompted me to leave the SMCR in 1997. The program, in loose terms, is broken. It is not beyond repair, but it is at least in need of an overhaul.
I’m not suggesting that there aren’t some squared away units in the SMCR or that Reserve units are not capable of being effectively employed. Recent combat operations have proven otherwise. When mobilized, SMCR units are virtually indistinguishable from active duty units, in that they have the full complement of Marine Corps administrative and logistics resources, not to mention adequate time to utilize those resources to their full potential.
However, the predeployment proficiency level of Reserve units, as well as the performance and function of nonmobilized units and personnel in their month-to-month operations, and the effect that has on the overall capability of the Reserve forces, is sorely lacking. I submit that if the Marine Corps is to continue its support of ongoing operations and expect effective performance from the Reserves, we need to reinvent the wheel.
I’m not talking about slapping a Band-Aid on Reserve issues but, instead, establishing the Marine Corps as the innovator amongst the Armed Services in terms of employment, utilization, and integration of the Reserves. I propose that we begin that process by addressing three key issues—the length and frequency of drill periods, expanded opportunities for reservists to interact with the Regular Component, and converting the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program into an innovative asset for the Operating Forces.
As has been discussed and published in the last couple of years, the 2 days per month plus 2-week active duty for training (AT) system is wholly inadequate, and I believe it sets up the SMCR for failure from the outset. As a noncommissioned officer (NCO), I’ll try to stick to what I know—the situation for junior Marines. I submit the following hypothetical scenario, some form of which I have seen played out at every Reserve command in which I’ve been involved.
A young individual chooses to join the Marine Corps as a reservist. He goes to boot camp, Marine combat training, and his military occupational specialty (MOS) school and lives life just like any other junior Marine. He’s motivated, proud of what he’s accomplished thus far, and accustomed to a certain level of performance and expectations. All of a sudden he’s back home amongst the civilians and checks in with his SMCR unit.
Here is what he sees on his drill weekends. There are 2 days of barely organized chaos, with an inordinate amount of time devoted to accountability formations and administrative, medical, or dental issues, and an almost equal amount of time devoted to just figuring out what to do next. Every once in a while his unit gets out and performs what passes for training, but even that is just a check in the block more than anything else.
He’s assigned proficiency and conduct marks by an NCO who can barely remember his name, much less give an honest assessment of his proficiency or conduct, because he hardly even knows the guy. The Marine doesn’t spend enough time in uniform or accomplish enough during the weekend “gong show” to feel justified in sticking his chest out a little when he calls himself a Marine.
His only interaction with the regular Marine Corps is when he’s mobilized or attends a combined arms exercise (CAX) or similar exercise. He begins to lose motivation, develops a bad attitude, and doesn’t complete his professional military education (PME). Before you know it he becomes an unsatisfactory participant and gets drummed out of the Corps administratively. The senior leadership of the unit is forced to devote time and effort that they can ill afford to babysitting another problem child and processing him out.
I think the primary reason for the above situation can be summed up in broad terms as a lack of immersion in the Marine culture, which requires more time in uniform. The junior Marine who is borderline in his dedication doesn’t feel involved enough to want to devote himself more fully and drifts away. The NCOs feel underresourced because they only have these Marines for about 16 hours per month; what can they possibly do as leaders to influence their troops if they spend only 2 percent of their time with them?
We need to take a serious look at some of the alternative drill schedules that have been proposed. Quarterly weeklong drills would allow the administrative circus to take place during the first couple of days, then allow the unit to accomplish something approaching real training for the remainder of the drill period. Instead of only one 2-week AT per year, we should require two. As it stands now, a well-run unit can manage to squeeze in the bare minimum basic skills training (BST) during the AT period, but it’s a tight fit, and there’s no room for much else.
For instance, when many SMCR units go to the rifle range, on the first day they generally get to fire three rounds for triangulation fire, then go immediately into prequalification. They then fire for qualification on the second day. How can we expect Marines to develop their shooting skills and shoot to the best of their abilities if we only provide three rounds of ammunition to get their dope straight, much less become comfortable with their weapons, prior to beginning the qualification stages? With two AT periods, adequate time can be devoted to BST, or one AT period can be utilized for BST/PME and the other for a training operation, such as CAX.
Many will argue that a plan such as this will require too much of the individual, and recruiting numbers will drop. While it is true that this plan will indeed require a whole new level of personal devotion and commitment on the part of individual Marines, I think the end result will be a great increase in the quality of our Reserve Marines for two reasons. First, those who are thinking of enlisting as reservists because it’s the easy way to wear the T-shirts and slap Marine Corps decals on their cars without buying the active duty round trip ticket will have to consider a much heavier commitment.
This greater commitment will likely deter those who lack the dedication we want in our Marines. Second, these Marines will be getting more and better training during their drill periods, as well as a more thorough immersion in the Marine culture. More prolonged periods of time together will foster a new level of effectiveness, cohesion, and esprit de corps.
Next, we should expand opportunities for all Reserve Marines to contribute to the effort by way of opening up billets throughout the Regular Marine Corps for them. This could be especially useful during this time of end strength increases. Many reservists find themselves in situations from time to time where they have an extended amount of time on their hands because they are college students or their civilian employment situation changes.
Many of them take advantage of those opportunities by requesting active duty special work orders, which allow them to work full time at their Reserve units. We also have the Active Reserve (AR) program that permits Marines to fill active duty billets in support of Reserve Marines. These Marines work in these jobs under a contractual obligation, often just as long as an active duty Marine would fill a billet with a given unit before getting orders to his next duty station.
How many times have we all been in a unit that was perpetually “short,” despite the fact that the MOS wasn’t closed at the time? Why not open up billets that need to be filled to AR Marines, without affecting the active duty promotion system by altering the available boat spaces? If an active duty Marine reports on station to fill the billet, carry the AR Marine as table of organization (T/O) in excess until his AR contract is up. These resources could easily be promoted by way of advertising billet vacancies via Reserve Duty OnLine and Reserve unit communications.
Finally, I propose that we develop a truly integrated active duty and Reserve Marine Corps by expanding and revamping the IMA program. We’ll never totally erase the line between Reserve Marine and active duty Marine, but it should not be as well defined as it is, and this is where we do it. We should develop a system by which virtually every active duty unit in the Marine Corps has a pool of reservists specifically assigned to it.
For instance, an active duty infantry battalion would have a Reserve component that would be capable of full integration into the unit, either on a small unit or an individual level. That battalion would have NCOs, staff NCOs, and an officer who would have collateral duties with that Reserve component, acting in a capacity similar to our current inspector-instructor (I&I) staffs.
All of the reservists’ administrative, medical, and logistical support would come from within the active duty battalion, thereby eliminating the widespread and notorious headaches associated with I&I shops. When the unit puts together its annual training plan, specific operations or exercises would be designated as possible AT periods for its reservists.
Unit deployments would require a minimum number of reservists to participate. This arrangement would allow IMA Marines to become an integral part of the active duty Marine Corps by putting them in the unit’s T/O and making them a resource for the command. I’ve heard it said before about the IMA program, “It’s a sweet deal for the individual Marine, but the Corps isn’t getting much bang for its buck.” It’s time that we change that.
Naturally these proposals will be a hard sell, both in terms of the respective Marine Corps communities involved and in Congress because of the budget expansions it would require. Hard selling is nothing new to Marines, and that aspect of it I leave in the capable hands of those in the appropriate pay grades.
In conclusion, if the Marine Corps is expected to continue its current level of contribution to the long war, we need to find new, more effective ways to utilize our Reserve. It’s a potentially tremendous resource, but it will require and demand more from the individual Marine. But that’s okay; he didn’t join the Corps to sit on his thumbs and accomplish nothing. Give him a reason to take pride in calling himself a Marine and he will deliver. Challenge him and require a new level of devotion and sacrifice. In turn, demonstrate a new level of support and dedication. The cumulative effect will be a Marine Corps with greater depth and a Reserve community that sets the standard for all of the other Armed Services.
